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Problem Description
The NTNU Test Satellite (NUTS) is an ongoing project which aims to build,
launch and operate a double CubeSat by 2015. The project is close to a pre-flight
test model, and the software and hardware must be integrated in order to complete
this model.
The thesis should focus on error handling and recovery specifications for the NUTS
project. The planning of error and recovery modes should be documented with
block diagrams and evaluated with respect to quality and simplicity. Different
fail safe systems are to be evaluated, after which some of them can be chosen for
implementation. Such systems can be reboot procedures, current consumption
monitoring and backup. Different ways of removing power and planning for a
delayed start of the satellite should be evaluated. Necessary self-tests and their
reliability should also be documented.
The main results of this Master Thesis should be:
• A detailed mission event plan aimed to minimize error and fault consequences
and maximize the probability of mission success.
• A new reliable hardware watchdog for removing lasting faults/failures by
toggling power to all subsystems.
• Defined modes of operation to tackle unforeseen events, lack of battery power
and/or loss of communication.
• A detailed and as accurate as possible power budget with the aim of creating
a solid basis for battery estimation and mission event planning.
• Provide a foundation for helping NUTS meet its goal of a 2015 launch.
Assignment given: 16. January 2014
Supervisor: Bjørn B. Larsen
Co-supervisor: Roger Birkeland

Abstract
NTNU Test Satellite (NUTS) is a student-built double CubeSat with a scheduled
launch in 2015. The project is multidisciplinary where students from all specialities
can apply both for thesis assignments and volunteer work. The satellite will be
in a low earth orbit (LEO) where radiation creates a challenging environment
for electronics and on-board systems. To counter the effects of space radiation,
a thorough and detailed mission event plan, as well as battery estimation and
methods for removing lasting faults have been evaluated and implemented.
Two watchdog solutions have been suggested, a global watchdog with triple mod-
ular redundancy (TMR) on the backplane and a solution with a local watchdog
on each master module. Both solutions have the capability to remove single event
latchups (SEL) by temporarily removing power to the affected module. Based
on results and analysis, the solution with two local watchdogs are the preferred
solution due to the increased complexity of the TMR solution. Furthermore, the
voter necessary in a TMR implementation is a single point of failure which if
malfunctioning, will leave the satellite unresponsive. Guidelines for choosing a
new watchdog system’s parameters are given. This includes the watchdog’s time-
out period, power-on-reset (POR) delay and a threshold voltage for the voltage
supervisory function.
Mission event plans are proposed for initial power-up, in-orbit power monitor-
ing, payload verification and satellite self-tests. A flowchart defining a software
watchdog responsible for maintaining an operational satellite is also presented.
An adjustable beacon rate enables power conservation by defining three different
transmission rates; low, normal and full rate. For the full rate, the power con-
sumption is estimated to 2200 mW, 233.33 % higher than in low rate and 100 %
higher than normal rate. A battery management framework has been proposed in
order to avoid a low battery condition.
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Sammendrag
NTNU Test Satelitt (NUTS) er en studentbygget satellitt med planlagt oppskyt-
ning i 2015. Prosjektet er et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom flere studiespesialiteter
på NTNU, og både masterkandidater og frivillige kan være med å utvikle satellit-
ten. Satellitten vil operere i lav jordbane (LEO) der stråling skaper utfordringer
for elektronikken og systemene ombord. For å håndtere strålingseffektene er det
gjennomført batteriestimering, laget en detaljert oppdragsplan og metoder for å
fjerne varige feil.
To forskjellige watchdog-system er foreslått hvor en er implementert på et testkort.
Det er foreslått en trippel modulær redundans (TMR) watchdog og en lokal watch-
dog på hver mastermodul. Begge løsningene kan fjerne single event latchup ved å
midlertidig skru av spenningen til den berørte modulen. Basert på oppnådde resul-
tat er en lokal watchdog å foretrekke grunnet økt kompleksitet i en TMR-løsning.
Dessuten skapte TMR-løsningen et single point of failure (SPF) i majoritetsvel-
geren, noe som vil sette satelliten ute av drift hvis den skulle svikte. Et nytt
watchdog-system har flere parametere som må velges, nemlig time-out-periode,
oppstartsforsinkelse (power-on-reset delay) og en terskelspenning. Oppgaven pre-
senterer retningslinjer for valg av disse parameterne.
Forslag til oppdragsplaner for første oppstart, effektforbruk, payload-kontroll og
selvtester er presentert. Flytdiagram for en software watchdog ansvarlig for å
opprettholde en fungerende satellitt er også presentert.
En justerbar senderate gir muligheten for å spare energi ved å bruke tre nivåer;
lav, normal og høy. I høyeste tilstand er effektforbruket 2200 Wm, 233.33 %
høyere enn i laveste tilstand og 100% høyere enn i normal tilstand. Et batteri
monitorinssystem har blit foreslått for å unngå laveste batteritilstad.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents the thesis’ motivation, problem description and disposition,
as well as relevant previous work.
1.1 Motivation
Norwegian University of Science and Technology’s (NTNU) Test Satellite (NUTS)
project has a goal of launching a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite by 2015. A LEO
satellite operates at heights of 500 km to about 2000 km [15], and it is estimated
that NUTS will operate at approximately 600 km.
The project aims at giving students hands-on training with cooperation between
specialities and to increase interest for science and technology in lower education
levels. This will hopefully help recruit candidates to higher education [16]. The
satellite is designed following the CubeSat standard where one cube must not
exceed 1.33 kg and measure only 10x10x10 cm [1], of which a satellite may combine
up to three such cubes. NUTS has decided to make a double CubeSat with a
maximum weight of 2.66 kg and maximum dimensions of 10x10x20 cm. The
project initially aimed at carrying an infrared (IR) camera to capture air glow
phenomena, but due to cost and complexity both in hardware and engineering, it
has been decided to replace the IR-camera with a visual range camera.
1.2 Problem Description
The NTNU Test Satellite (NUTS) is an ongoing project which aims to build,
launch and operate a double CubeSat by 2015. The project is close to a pre-flight
test model, and the software and hardware must be integrated in order to complete
this model.
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The thesis should focus on error handling and recovery specifications for the NUTS
project. The planning of error and recovery modes should be documented with
block diagrams and evaluated with respect to quality and simplicity. Different
fail safe systems are to be evaluated, after which some of them can be chosen for
implementation. Such systems can be reboot procedures, current consumption
monitoring and backup. Different ways of removing power and planning for a
delayed start of the satellite should be evaluated. Necessary self-tests and their
reliability should also be documented.
The main results of this Master Thesis should be:
• A detailed mission event plan aimed to minimize error and fault consequences
and maximize the probability of mission success.
• A new reliable hardware watchdog for removing lasting faults/failures by
toggling power to all subsystems.
• Defined modes of operation to tackle unforeseen events, lack of battery power
and/or loss of communication.
• A detailed and as accurate as possible power budget with the aim of creating
a solid basis for battery estimation and mission event planning.
• Provide a foundation for helping NUTS meet its goal of a 2015 launch.
1.3 Thesis Outline & Contributions
A brief outline of this thesis can be given as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the given CubeSat standard and requirements, as well as NUTS’
mission goals and mission lifetime. Theory presented in Chapter 3 will form the
thesis’ foundation and Chapter 4 introduces the current NUTS system. Chap-
ter 5 presents estimates to solar cells’ charging power and the satellite’s power
consumption. Chapter 6 sets the requirements for NUTS’ mission plans and is
the foundation the planning results in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 presents the design
of two new watchdog solutions. Chapter 9 proceeds with watchdog testing and
presents achieved results. It also presents battery management for different levels
of remaining battery capacity. Results are discussed throughout Chapter 10 before
conclusions are made in Chapter 11.
Work presented in this thesis will aim at providing NUTS with a new watchdog
system, a mission event plan, defined battery and operation modes, as well as an
initial power budget. These are all necessary parts of NUTS’ pre-flight test model,
which is scheduled for completion during fall 2014.
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1.4 Previous Work
The NUTS project was started in September 2010 and is part of the Norwegian
Student Satellite Program run by Norwegian Center for Space-Related Education
(NAROM).
NTNU has previously been part of two other CubeSats, NCUBE-1 and NCUBE-
2. These projects were in collaboration with different universities and university
colleges across Norway. None of the satellites were able to initialize contact with
a ground station after launch. NCUBE-2 was launched on October 27, 2005, and
was successful in reaching orbiting, but radio contact with the satellite was never
achieved. NCUBE-1 was launched on July 26, 2006, but a problem with the
second stage of the rocket prevented the satellite from reaching orbit [11]. Figure
1.1 shows the complete NCUBE-2 before launch.
Figure 1.1: NCUBE-2. Photo by: Bjørn Pedersen, NTNU
NUTS consists of both volunteer and project/master thesis work. NUTS is handled
by the Department of Electronic and Telecommunication (IET) at NTNU, and
master students from several departments may apply to the project. The project
is currently lead by project manager Roger Birkeland and project coordinator
Amund Gjersvik. NUTS is a multidisciplinary project where an open dialogue is
required to achieve common goals.
Since the beginning in 2010, several students have committed a large amount
of work and research. The most notable contributions related to this thesis are
present below.
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1.4.1 2013 Master Thesis
Error Detection and Correction for Low-Cost Nano Satellites - Kjell
Arne Ødegaard
K.A. Ødegaard [17] focused on different low level software solutions to deal with
error detection and correction. This thesis will focus on hardware solutions and
more application level implementations in order to minimize fault probability and
consequences.
1.4.2 2012 Master Thesis
Electrical Power System of the NTNU Test Satellite - Lars Erik Jacob-
sen
L. E. Jacobsen focuses on the power system of the satellite and finalization of the
Electrical Power System (EPS) module [18]. This thesis has been a foundation
for the solar panels and the batteries, as well as how the power distribution is
intended.
1.4.3 2011 Master Thesis
Power Distribution and Conditioning for a Small Student Satellite -
Dewald De Bruyn
The thesis from D. D. Bruyn serves as a main specification for the current back-
plane design [11]. The backplane prototypes are still being used in testing today
and interconnects the satellite’s modules.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides a brief overview of the CubeSat standard, requirements and
mission goals for the NUTS project.
2.1 CubeSat Standard
The CubeSat standard began as a collaborative project between California Poly-
technic State University (CalPoly) and Stanford University. The purpose of the
project was to develop a standard design for picosatellites in order to reduce cost,
shorten development time and make frequent launches into space possible [1].
2.1.1 Electrical Requirements
The standard has a list of electrical requirements and some of the most important
are [1]:
• No electronics shall be active during launch to prevent any electrical or RF
interference with the launch vehicle and primary payloads.
• All systems shall be turned off, including real time clocks.
• The CubeSat shall include at least one deployment switch on the designated
rail standoff to completely turn off satellite power once actuated.
2.1.2 Operational Requirements
The operational requirements for the satellite are [1]:
• All deployables such as booms, antennas and solar panels shall wait to de-
ploy a minimum of 30 minutes after the CubeSat’s deployment switches are
activated from the P-POD ejection.
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• RF transmitters greater than 1 mW shall wait to transmit a minimum of
30 minutes after the CubeSat’s deployment switches are activated from the
P-POD ejection.
2.1.3 CubeSat Mechanisms
Figure 2.1 shows the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD). NUTS will be
inserted into this orbital deployer together with a single CubeSat from a different
party. At the bottom railing of each satellite there is two deployment switches
which breaks the connection between the battery and the electrical systems, caus-
ing the satellite to be disabled while inside the P-POD. Figure 2.2 shows the railing
deployment switch in a single CubeSat.
Figure 2.1: Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer [1]
Figure 2.2: Railing deployment switch [1]
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2.2 Mission Goals
NUTS’ mission statement is to design, develop, test, launch and operate a double
CubeSat.
A mission success is given by the following criteria [19]:
• Deliver a tested satellite according to mission specification
• Transmit a beacon signal receivable for radio amateurs
• Confirm successful de-tumbling - i.e. stabilize the satellite after ejection from
the P-POD
• Establish two-way communication and receive full telemetry
• Initiate camera pointing and capture an image
• Receive a valid image
The mission is consider successful if one or several of the above criteria are fulfilled.
The main goal is to identify the NUTS beacon signal and thereby having a positive
confirmation of an operational satellite. If the satellite is able of capturing and
transmitting an image, the mission is a complete success. As given by the project
management, the desired mission lifetime for NUTS is 3 months.
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Chapter 3
Theory
This chapter focuses on theory which is necessary for forming a solid background
for the rest of the thesis. This includes space radiation, redundancy, as well as
background on solar panel charging and battery estimation.
3.1 Definitions
Throughout this thesis, terms and expressions will be used to describe different
phenomenons. This section will provide the definitions of these.
• Failure - When a system deviates from its intended state and does not pre-
sented a desirable result.
• Faults - Defects or abnormal conditions in software and/or hardware which
may cause failures.
• Errors - Unexpected problems internal to a system which manifests them-
selves externally as failures.
3.2 Space Radiation
One of the biggest concerns in space is radiation. For most low earth orbits (LEO),
the radiation environment is harsher compared to the Earth’s surface, but not as
harsh as the higher orbits or deep space. Radiation is particles emitted from various
sources which may lead to degradation and even cause failure of the electronics and
the electrical system [20]. Solar flares, galactic cosmic rays and particles trapped
in Earth’s magnetic field are all sources of space radiation. Galactic cosmic rays
are high energy particles, most of which are atomic nuclei, but also high energy
electrons, positrons and other subatomic particles [21]. The energy of cosmic rays
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are measured in units of megaelectronvolt (MeV) or gigaelectronvolt (GeV)1. Most
cosmic rays range in energy between 100 MeV and 10 GeV [21].
During a solar flare, radiation can increase substantially over a short period of
time and create more high energy radiation particles. This is shown in Figure 3.1
where the effect is documented by NASA’s Cassini Spacecraft. It is important to
note that space radiation varies with time, and therefore its effect on electronics
is not constant.
Figure 3.1: Data error rate during a solar flare as captured by the spacecraft
Cassini [2]
When radiation reaches Earth, it will be affected by Earth’s electromagnetic field
which traps the particles, accelerating them and forming belts of radiation. These
belts endanger satellites and sensitive components must be adequately shielded if
they orbit for a significant amount of time in these radiation belts. The belts are
called Van Allen radiation belts and as Figure 3.2 shows, Earth has two encircling
it.
The belts vary in altitude from 3000 km to 20 000 km [22], higher than most LEOs,
but due to its asymmetric nature, a region in the Atlantic, near Argentina and
Brazil, has relatively high concentrations of electrons. This is known as the South
Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) and is for a LEO satellite’s electronics, a large source of
single event effects [2]. Figure 3.3 shows where this high concentration of electrons
occur. Further more, the belts are close to non-existing near Earth’s magnetic
poles, causing a harsher radiation environment for satellites in polar orbit.
The particles are mainly protons and electrons which are trapped within the belts
by the Earth’s magnetic field. The inner belt consists of highly energetic protons,
1One electron volt is the energy gained when an electron is accelerated through a potential
difference of 1 volt [21]
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Figure 3.2: Van Allen belts [3]
Figure 3.3: Single event effects in the South Atlantic Anomaly [4]
with energy exceeding 30 MeV. The outer belt contains charged particles of both
atmospheric and solar origin. The protons in the outer belt have much lower
energy levels and the most energetic particles of the outer belt are electrons. These
electrons can reach several hundred MeV [22].
There are several radiation effects on electronics in space, of which total ionizing
dose (TID) and single event effects (SEE) are of the most common.
3.2.1 Total Ionizing Dose - TID
Total ionizing dose (TID) is the accumulation of ionizing dose deposition over
time. This occurs mainly as an effect of protons and electrons, and the ionization
creates charges or electron-hole pairs in oxides. This could lead to circuit parameter
changes and over time make the circuit ceases to function [5]. Figure 3.4 shows
trapped positive charges inside the gate oxide. TID is difficult to mitigate since it
occurs both in powered and unpowered states and accumulates over time [23]. TID
can be handled through careful parts selection and shielding [24]. NASA sets the
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worst case dose rates for a LEO to 1-10 krad(Si) per year [20], and typical total dose
failure levels of microprocessors at 15-70 krad(Si) [25]. A krad(Si) is a commonly
used unit for measuring total ionizing dose where Si refers to the material silicon. In
reference to the SI unit of gray, 1 krad(Si) equals 10 miligray [23]. Seen in context
with the NUTS mission’s short lifetime of only 3 months, this would indicate that
TID is not to become an issue for the satellite’s microcontrollers. Therefore further
mitigation of TID will not be considered in this thesis.
Figure 3.4: Trapped positive charges inside a transistor [5]
3.2.2 Single Event Effect - SEE
Cosmic radiation can cause spontaneous SEE by releasing energy when penetrating
a component. This energy will cause a charge at a node and lead to a short current
pulse as shown in Figure 3.5. SEE is divided into the following subcategories.
Figure 3.5: Particle producing an ionization track [5]
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Single Event Upset
An SEU is caused by an internal charge deposition, which causes a bit-flip in a
memory element or a change of state in a logic circuit. This could cause both
non-destructive effects and destructive effects. Non-destructive effects could be
corruption of information stored in a memory element or change a logic element’s
state. This can be resolved by refreshing the elements with the correct value. A
destructive effect could be microprocessor program corruption, e.g. a calculation
error, freezing or wrong command execution [5]. In Ødegaard’s thesis [17], it has
been stated that in a 128kB of RAM, as many as 10 bit-flips may accumulate per
day in orbit.
Single Event Transient
An SET is a single transient current or a voltage spike. This spike can propagate
through logic gates and produce system failures. If this spike is captured by a
storage element, the SET may become an SEU [5].
Single Event Latchup
An SEL causes a permanent bit-flip and prevents it from exiting the logic state.
The circuit must be powered down in order to correct the condition [23]. For
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) electronics, an article from Journal of Modern
Physics [26] reports a recovery time, i.e. the time a device must be unpowered,
between 50 and 300 ms, while an article presented at the 11th AIAA/USU Con-
ference on Small Satellites [27] reports recovery times from 45 µs to 2.5 ms. SELs
happen due to of unintentional current flow between components on an integrated
circuit [5]. This is a result of parasitic NPN-PNP transistors in the CMOS struc-
tures, which may cause both high and low current flow conditions. A high and low
current condition can be discriminated between by having an accurate estimate
of a module’s power consumption when performing a predetermined task [24]. If
not handled in time, SELs may cause irreparable damage [23]. Testing carried out
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [24], determined a rate of SELs for a
commercial R3000 microprocessor in a worst-case LEO space environment such as
a solar flare or passing through the SAA. With 2.54 mm of aluminium shielding,
the microcontroller would experience SELs every few days, based on which the
study [24] concluded mitigation of SELs was necessary. Note that NUTS carries
little to no shielding, and may hence suffer from increased rates of SELs.
Single Event Burnout
An SEB is the most critical form of SEE. If the current from an SEL is not limited
in a timely manner, it may cause the device to overheat and burn up. This effect is
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permanent and irreversible [5]. SEBs can only be prevented by careful component
selection [24] and by reducing SELs.
In this thesis only SELs and SEUs are considered since reducing and mitigating
these also will resolve issues regarding the other single single event effects.
3.3 Mitigating Space Radiation Effects
There are several ways of reducing the effects of radiation. One may choose an
orbit with a lower level of radiation, but this is not always a viable option. Adding
shielding to reduce the radiation dose is also been proving to work, but this in-
creases the total weight. However, increased shielding may lead to worse secondary
particles when very high energy radiation interacts with materials with a high num-
ber of protons in their nucleus [2]. The use of radiation hardened components also
increases radiation robustness, but such components are often expensive and not
readily available. Furthermore, the use of radiation hardened components defeats
the purpose of a low cost, student-built satellite where cheap commercial compo-
nents are the backbone of the design. A cost effective solution is a system-level
error correction architecture which requires very little special hardware and can
be modified if the system needs different functionality in a later stage.
3.3.1 Redundancy
In order to have a fault tolerant system, the designer must expect that something
will fail and yet be able achieve an operational system. This is in contrast to
fault avoidance, where the designer aims at reducing the amount of faults that
occur, e.g. by adding shielding or using radiation hardened components [23]. All
techniques for achieving fault tolerance rely on extra elements introduced into the
system to detect and recover from faults. There are two types of redundancy;
hardware and software redundancy. Hardware redundancy is further divided into
static and dynamic redundancy [28]. Static redundancy is redundant components
inside a system or subsystem to hide effects of faults, while dynamic redundancy
is to activate an unpowered spare when an original component fails [23].
Triple Modular Redundancy - TMR
An example of static redundancy is triple modular redundancy (TMR) which con-
sists of three identical modules and a majority voter between them. If one of the
modules differ from the others, the disagreeing member is masked out. In order
to mask faults from more than one module, n modular redundancy (NMR) must
be used where n denotes the number of modules[28]. TMR is commonly used to
handled radiation impacts in electronics used in space [2]. TMR yields a system
CHAPTER 3. THEORY 15
with a higher fault-coverage and higher reliability, but with adding more hardware
there is a higher risk of multiple failures over time, leading to a shorter time of
life [23]. For a CubeSat application this may be acceptable due to often short
mission lifetimes. TMR can operate through a failure in one of the modules, while
a self-checking pair with dual redundancy only yields a fail-safe [23]. Another issue
with a TMR system is the injection of the voter as a single point of failure, which
may be acceptable since the voter circuit often is much less complicated than the
systems which generate the inputs to the voter and hence is less prone to failure
[29]. In order to further increase the reliability of the system, the voter can be
implemented with radiation hardened components and/or be replicated. By repli-
cating the voter to each part where its output is used, a malfunctioning voter will
not cripple the entire system, but only affect the part to which it is connected.
This comes at the cost of more hardware and consumed real estate [23].
Functional Redundancy
Redundancy with a higher form of granularity is functional redundancy and it is
often used in space applications. Instead of replicating a module to mask failures,
a similar module exists which can inherit the functionality of the malfunctioning
module and support further operations, either at full or degraded performance.
This is similar to the systems used on Skylab in 1973 [23] where each computer
first ran a self-check and if it believed itself to be healthy and the other computer
to be malfunctioning, the partner would be reset.
3.3.2 Watchdogs
A watchdog is an electronic circuit or a software program that detects and initiates
corrective actions to a hardware or a program error. A watchdog must initiate two
action; first it must set the output the system to a safe state as to prevent unwanted
consequences. After setting the output to a safe state is must restore to a normal
operating mode. This could be as simple as to restart the system or it may involve
a sequence of actions [6].
A watchdog can respond to faults more quickly than an external operator, making
it invaluable in cases where an operator would be too slow, or unavailable, to react
to a fault condition [6].
For an external hardware watchdog, a controller, often an MCU, can reset the
timer by toggling an input pin (WDI) to the watchdog within a known time-out
period. This is known as tapping and during normal operation the controller
regularly taps this pin to indicate that the program is functioning as expected. If
a fault occurs and prevents the controller from tapping the timer, the watchdog
will time out and initiate an action to recover the system [30]. In the case where
the watchdog causes power to be removed, the amount of time before power is
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brought back on is known as a power-on-reset (POR) delay. Figure 3.6 shows a
basic digital watchdog timer.
Several MCUs contain an internal watchdog timer (WDT) which performs a reset
of the MCU if not tapped within the time-out period. The time-out period can
be windowed, meaning if it is tapped too slow or too fast, it will issue a reset
regardless [30]. Software is responsible for tapping the watchdog and can in some
implementations adjust its time-out period or disable it altogether. A watchdog
design can combine software, hardware and internal watchdogs to create a more re-
liable system. The external hardware watchdog can be tapped conditionally based
on results from the software watchdog’s system health checks, while the internal
watchdog can be tapped unconditionally to recover from e.g. code corruption [30].
Figure 3.6: Basic digital watchdog timer [6]
3.3.3 Radiation Hardened Components
Figure 3.7 shows a comparison of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), radiation-
enhanced and radiation-hardened components. It is clear that the commercial
components does not have a minimum requirement for radiation tolerance, lead-
ing to variations between manufactures, processes and applications. It also shows
that radiation hardened components are design towards tolerating a much higher
total ionizing dose (TID) than commercial ICs, but may still suffer from SELs
and SEUs [7]. Furthermore, radiation hardened components are often difficult to
source since they may be covered by strict military and export regulations, and
processes used to hardened ICs are often kept as company secrets. In a design
where commercial components are used, such as the NUTS project, the variations
related to COTSs necessitates a design aimed at being as fault tolerant as possible.
CubeSats are often design without radiation hardened components due to costs
and the missions’ short lifetimes.
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Figure 3.7: Radiation hardness requirements [7]
3.4 Vacuum Considerations
All electronics generate a certain amount of heat which must be dissipated through
one or several of the three different ways possible; by conduction, convection and/or
radiation. In the vacuum environment of space, heat dissipation through convec-
tion is close to none, and with radiation being highly ineffective, maintaining good
heat transfer by conduction is critical [31]. Also, with box-packaged components,
a vacuum environment may effect their performance and thermal vacuum testing
is necessary in order to ensure correct functionality [31]. Telemetry from California
Polytechnic State University’s CP3 CubeSat shows external temperature fluctua-
tions between -40◦C to +40◦C in LEO [32]. The temperature extremes may vary
based on orbit parameters, and internal temperatures may be higher than external
due to power dissipation in electronics and charging of batteries.
3.5 Solar Cells
Solar panels, which is an array of solar cells, harvest energy from sunlight and
convert it into electricity. Generation of electricity is possible because of the pho-
tovoltaic effect [33]. The photovoltaic effect is the creation of an voltage in a
closed loop and begins when two dissimilar materials in close contact produce an
electric voltage when struck by light [34]. Light striking crystals such as silicon
or germanium, where electrons usually are not free to move from atom to atom,
provides the energy needed to free some electrons from their bound condition [34].
Free electrons cross the junction between the two dissimilar crystals more easily in
one direction than in the other, giving one side of the junction a negative charge
and hence a negative voltage with respect to the opposite side. The photovoltaic
effect will continue to provide voltage and current as long as light strikes the two
materials [34].
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3.6 Battery Charging
Battery theory is a large field, but a short presentation of charging characteristics
related to NUTS will presented here.
The manufactures publish the nominal rating for a given set of discharge conditions
and is given by the rate of discharge, temperature and minimum cell voltage. The
minimum cell voltage is the lowest voltage to which a battery should be discharged.
Discharging below this value can reduce or even destroy the battery’s capacity [35].
The rate of discharge refers to the amount of current a battery can sustain for one
hour while remaining within a specified voltage range.
When current is drawn from a fully charged battery, the voltage decreases gradually
from nominal voltage to the discharged voltage. When the discharge curve for a
typical battery is plotted, the cell voltage remains relatively flat until the discharge
voltage is reached. When the discharge voltage is reached the battery capacity is
exhausted [35]. Figure 3.8 illustrates such as curve. The same principle applies
when charging the battery.
Figure 3.8: Battery discharge curve [8]
3.7 Beta Angle
The beta angle is the angle between the Sun vector and the orbital plane of any
Earth-orbiting object [9]. Figure 3.9 illustrates how the Sun vector projects onto
Earth and shows the Earth’s axis and Equator. The beta angle determines how
long an object in LEO, e.g. a satellite, can be exposed to direct sunlight and varies
from +90◦ to −90◦. The direction the satellite revolves around the body it orbits,
determines whether the beta angle sign is positive or negative [36].
CHAPTER 3. THEORY 19
With a high beta angle the satellite is exposed to the Sun more often. With a beta
angle of +/−90◦ the satellite spends no time in eclipse. With a low beta angle the
eclipse time becomes longer and with a beta angle of 0◦ the satellite will have the
longest possible eclipse time [9]. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 shows satellite positions at
different beta angles in relation the Sun vector. This thesis applies a worst case
situation of a 0◦ beta angle for solar charging estimates.
Figure 3.9: Illustration of the Sun vector [9]
Figure 3.10: High beta angle [9] Figure 3.11: Low beta angle [9]
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Chapter 4
System Overview
This chapter presents NUTS’ system overview. The two main systems are the
two master modules, On-Board Computer (OBC) and Radio module. Some of the
different integrated circuits (ICs) performing important, dedicated tasks, are also
presented.
Appendix A shows the initial block diagram of the system. A new and more
detailed block diagram is presented in this chapter.
4.1 On-Board Computer - OBC
The OBC consists of an Atmel Microcontroller Unit (MCU), Ferroelectric RAM,
NAND flash and various headers.
The Atmel AT32UC3A3 MCU is a complete System-on-Chip MCU based on a
RISC architecture. It can run at frequencies up to 84 MHz, has a high-performance
32-bit microprocessor core, 256 kB programmable flash and 2x32 kB SRAM. It is
designed for cost-sensitive embedded applications, with emphasis on low power
consumption, high code density and high performance. The MCU has an absolute
maximum current consumption of 100 mA, but consumes only 30.4 mA running
in active mode at 42 MHz[37].
It also contains an internal watchdog circuit which, when enabled, must be tapped
within a time-out window in order to avoid a soft reset. A reset caused by this
watchdog will let its software know a reset has occurred as well as what the source
for the reset was [37]. This is in contrast to a hard reset, i.e. removal of power.
If an internal soft reset does not recover the system, an external hardware system
will toggle power to the MCU if not tapped within its time-out period.
The more radiation resistant FRAM will hold mission critical data and firmware
code, while the 2 GB NAND flash will be used as primary storage for images
from the camera payload and system logs. Ferroelectric Random Access Memory
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is a type of non-volatile memory which uses a ferroelectric layer instead of the
classical dielectric layer found in many types of volatile DRAM architectures [38].
Compared to other types of non-volatile memories, FRAM has a faster write per-
formance, lower power consumption and a greater maximum write-erase cycles at
the cost of lower storage densities, storage capacity limitations and higher produc-
tion cost [39]. What makes FRAM an interesting option for space applications
is its high resistance to radiation, fast programming time, solid data retention
over a large temperature range and a high endurance rating [40]. The aim is to
use FRAM as the main storage for mission critical data and the microcontrollers’
firmware. NUTS’ FRAM chip holds 4 Mbit of storage, which equals 512 kB.
Figure 4.1 shows a possible block diagram of the OBC with all the systems, both
software and hardware. Note that the external memories overview does not show
the current memory configurations.
4.2 Radio Module
The Radio module has the same components as the OBC, in addition to the nec-
essary radio components. Figure 4.2 shows a possible configuration of the Radio
module. Note that the external memories overview does not show the current mem-
ory configurations. Both Figure 4.1 and 4.2 are made in collaboration with NUTS’
software group. The Radio module consists of two different radio transceivers, one
UHF at 437 MHz, and one VHF at 145 MHz. The VHF band is used by an OWL1
radio which can be controlled by the OBC regardless of an operational Radio
MCU, yielding an additional layer of communication redundancy.
NUTS system is design such that it is possible to utilize the Ferroelectric RAM
(FRAM) if the NAND flash memory fails, and vice versa. If both of the non-
volatile memories are damaged, operations may continue with volatile memories
as long as power is maintained. The system is also designed such that if the OBC
fails, its functions can be taken over by the Radio module.
4.2.1 Antenna Release Mechanism
From the CubeSat operational requirements in Section 2.1.2 all antennas must
wait a minimum of 30 minutes after ejection from the Poly Pico-Satellite Orbital
Deployer (P-POD) before deploying. The satellite will carry the antennas coiled
up inside the satellite before and during launch. After ejection and the 30 minutes
delay, the antennas will deploy. The release mechanism will consists of four resis-
tance wires designed to melt nylon cords. The satellite will have four antennas,
arranged in two pairs for the VHF and UHF. As of 2014, design of the release
1Design with emphasis on receiver sensitivity and called OWL due to owl’s excellent hearing
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Figure 4.1: On-board computer module
mechanism is not finished, but initial tests shows a current consumption of ap-
proximately 350 mA per wire. Due to the importance of deploying the antennas,
several consecutive burn-off attempts will be made after NUTS has reached orbit.
4.2.2 Beacon
The beacon signal can be regarded as the basic sign of life from the satellite while
in orbit. This signal will be the first signal the ground station will receive and
it indicates whether or not the satellite is operational. The beacon transmits at
a given rate since it provides important tracking and identification. It has been
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Figure 4.2: Radio module
decided by the project management that the beacon is never to be disabled due
to the importance of maintaining radio contact with the satellite.
At the beginning of the mission it could be useful to transmit more often since this
will help in determine if the satellite is operative after ejection from the P-POD.
After the ground station receives the first beacon signal, the periodic rate could
be decreased in order to save power.
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4.3 Backplane
The backplane provides redundant power supply and current limitation to each
module. This section will provide a brief overview of important structures already
in place. In Appendix B a circuit diagram of the power distribution and control
logic is shown. The hardware drawings are from Bruyn’s thesis [11]. Figure 4.3
at the end of this chapter shows the existing design with the OBC and backplane
connected together. The backplane features eight connectors enabling a total of
two master modules and six submodules. The existing backplane implementation
has a measured current consumption of 50 mA.
4.3.1 Power OR-ing - Linear Technologies LTC4413
LCT4413 is a power OR-ing chip capable of handling two independent power
sources and switch between them if one fails. This enables continued operation
even in the event of loss of one supply. The backplane receives two independent
3.3 V and two 5 V lines from four regulators on the EPS module, each connected
to two power OR-ing chips for redundancy. The backplane distributes these four
lines to each module, each with a separate power OR-ing chip. LTC4413 consists
of two ideal diodes each capable of supplying up to 2.6 A between 2.5 V and 5.5
V [41].
4.3.2 Current Monitor - Texas Instruments INA219
The backplane and EPS have multiple current monitors from Texas Instrument.
INA219 is a high-side current shunt and power monitor with an I2C interface
capable of providing instantaneous voltage and current flow measurements [42].
4.3.3 Current Limiter - Maxim Integrated MAX14523
MAX14523 current-limit switches features programmable current limitation to pre-
vent damage to connected components due to faulty load conditions [10]. The
current limiter has been implemented for two reasons: module power switching
and over-current protection, and with a limit of 640 mA [11]. The current limit
can be adjusted from 250 mA to 1.5 A to satisfy a preferred limit specific to the
application. This will help mitigate high current single event latchups if the cur-
rent limit is set correctly. A good estimate of each module’s current consumption
will help determine this level.
The MAX14523 features an ON pin which in the current design is connected to the
two master modules, enabling them to turn off power to separate submodules by
setting the connected line low. This is seen in Figure B.4 in Appendix B where the
signal PWR_ON1 is used to turn the chip on or off. Each module has a separate
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signal and the suffix 1 indicates a signal connected to module 1. It also shows
the PWR_FLAG1 signal which goes low in an over-current situation. The signal
is accessible by the OBC and Radio MCUs enabling them to perform necessary
actions. It is important to note that a master can not turn itself off and can only
be disabled by the other master.
4.4 Submodules
NUTS’ submodules are Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS),
Electrical Power System (EPS) and the camera payload.
4.4.1 Attitude Determination and Control System - ADCS
ADCS orients the satellite in space using magnetic coils, performs de-tumbling
and points the camera payload towards Earth. Work on the ADCS module is
concurrently being performed at the Department of Engineering Cybernetics at
NTNU and more information can be found in [43] and [44]. The ADCS consumes
500 mA if all coils to turn the satellite are active. This value is a preliminary
calculation provided by NUTS member Øyvind Rein.
4.4.2 Electrical Power System - EPS
Electrical Power System (EPS) supplies the satellite with the correct and redun-
dant voltages for the backplane, protects the batteries from overcharging and
charges the batteries from the solar panels [18]. Power from the EPS is distributed
to the backplane and submodules through the LTC4413 power OR-ing. NUTS will
launch with a fully charged battery.
4.4.3 Camera Payload
The initial plan was to have an IR camera as a payload, but due to costs both
financially and in engineering, the project decided to use an visual range camera
instead. Based on a NTNU project report from the fall 2013 [45], a low power visual
range camera will be implemented as a payload. The payload has an estimate
current consumption of 164 mA.
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4.5 Ground Station
A ground station for transmitting and receiving data to and from NUTS is located
at Gløshaugen in Trondheim, Norway (63◦25′06.3”N10◦23′58.2”E). The station is
capable of transmitting and receiving both UHF and VHF signals, and can track
the satellite from when it rises above the horizon until it leaves the line of sight.
4.6 Evaluation of Existing Watchdog & Power
Modules
In Bruyn’s thesis [11], a watchdog has been implemented, but it only resets the
state of the I2C repeaters to a default on state and does not remove the power which
is necessary for removing SELs. Only the master modules can remove power to
the submodules and if one or both masters stop responding, the current watchdog
will not recover the system. With the current design it is not possible to remove
the supply voltage for the backplane logic, which again will inhibit on the system’s
capability of recovering from SELs. A new revision of the watchdog should aim at
mitigating these issues. Hardware drawings of the existing watchdog are presented
in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.
Another issue discussed in Bruyn’s thesis is the dual use of an address line to tap
the watchdog. The ADDR0 line is connected to the watchdog’s input, but is also
used elsewhere. This can be seen in Figure B.3 in Appendix B. The ADDR[2..0]
lines are supposed to address the correct module by address match. Using the
ADDR0 line to tap the watchdog could lead to toggling of an address signal and
cause a mismatch when attempting to address a module. Also, if the ADDR0 line
is held stable while addressing a module, the current watchdog could time-out and
cause an unnecessary reset.
Figure 4.3: Existing prototype of on-board computer (OBC) and backplane
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Chapter 5
Battery Charging & Discharging
This chapter presents estimated battery consumption and charging for different
levels of beacon activity. Results achieved forms the basis for deciding when action
must be taken in a low battery situation.
5.1 Battery Estimation
Since battery management is an integral part of keeping the satellite operational,
a solid estimate is necessary as a foundation for a mission plan of high quality.
Table 5.1 shows a rough initial estimate of the satellite’s power consumption. The
values have been measured, calculated or based on datasheet information.
Table 5.1: Estimated power consumption spring 2014
Component Operating voltage [V] Current draw [mA] Watt [mW] Method
Backplane 3.3 50 165 Measured
OBC MCU 3.3 100 330 Datasheet [37]
Radio MCU 3.3 100 330 Datasheet [37]
NAND Flash 3.3 30 99 Datasheet [46]
FRAM 3.3 20 66 Datasheet [47]
Power amplifier1 3.3 1000 3300 Measured
OWL Radio2 5.0 462 2310 Calculated
ADCS 3.3 500 1650 Calculated
Camera Payload 3.3 164 541.2 Calculated
TOTAL - 2426 8791.2
Note that the MCUs’ power consumption is a maximum value from the datasheet,
which in reality will be dependent on GIPO use and software execution. Values
for the NAND flash and FRAM is per chip, and NUTS has two of each.
1Power amplifier’s power consumption was measured by the radio group March 2014 during
a test flight.
2Information provided by its designer. Power consumption is independent of input voltage.
Datasheet sets the current draw to 140 mA at 16.5 V, giving 2310 mW.
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The satellite carries a 4.4 Ah battery pack with a nominal voltage of 6.6 V, giving
a capacity of 29.04 Wh. It has 18 solar cells divided into five solar panels, four
at the sides and one at the top. The side panels have four solar cells and the top
panel has two solar cells.
Power generated from the solar panels can be seen in Table 5.2. The worst case,
best case and the average case are calculated based on Bruyn’s thesis [11] and a
report from Amund Gjersvik [48].
Table 5.2: Power from solar panels
Solar panels
# of panels 18
One solar cell voltage 3 2.409 V
One solar cell current 4 502.9 mA
One solar cell power generation 1.211 W
One side 4.846 W
Top 2.423 W
Top + two sides 7.514 W
Two sides 5.091 W
One side & top 5.437 W
Average charging power 5.062 W
By normalizing the orbit time with respect to one hour, it is possible to find the
relationship between charging time and time spent in eclipse as seen in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Orbit times at 600 km above the Earth’s surface [11]
Per orbit Minutes % Normalized [min]
Time in sun 61.1 63.32 % 38 - tsun
Time in eclipse 35.4 36.68 % 22 - teclipse
Total 96.5 100 % 60 - ttotal
By applying the average charging power from Table 5.2, a normalized charging
power is given in Equation 5.1.
Pnorm = Pavg · tsun
ttotal
= 5.062 W · 3860 = 3.205 W (5.1)
Eclipse time per orbit is a maximum based on the worst case beta angle of 0◦
from Section 3.7. The beta angle can not be determined due to unknown launch
parameters outside of the project’s control. Best case charging is achieved at a
3Datasheet gives this value as beginning of lifetime and it decreases when the solar panel is
exposed to radiation. After irradiation of 1 · 1015 at 1 MeV, the voltage is expected to be 2.191
V as given in its datasheet [49]
4Also beginning of liftime. After irradiation of 1 · 1015 at 1 MeV, the current is expected to
decrease to 477.6 mA as given in its datasheet [49]
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beta angle of +/−90◦ where top and two sides are exposed to the Sun throughout
the orbit, causing a charging power of 7.514 W.
5.1.1 Battery Fuel Gauge
Measuring the battery’s net current flow is important in order to enable an estimate
of remaining battery capacity. In the existing design this is done by the current
monitors (INA219) on the electrical power system (EPS) which is unfortunate since
a master must retrieve the information, which can accumulate an error over time
if not retrieved often enough. The accumulated error will occur due to change in
voltage while at the same capacity level due to temperature, impedance differences,
and discharge current [50]. Accurate tracking of the battery capacity requires a
dedicated system to monitor the current from the battery at all times. If the
current is not measured continuously, the remaining capacity will be only a rough
estimate. It is also problematic if a master module is tasked with continuously
measuring current to accurately report battery capacity. An independent system
should measure the current consumption and process the information so the master
module may focus on other tasks. Battery fuel gauging is the process of collecting
data such as current, voltage and temperature, and then use this data to calculate
an accurate estimate of remaining battery capacity [50]. Integration of a fuel gauge
is an issue that project management deems important towards a completed pre-
flight test model and at their request, an example of a suitable candidate has been
found.
A fuel gauge must be compatible with the LiFePO4 battery chemistry and the
multi-cell battery configuration used for NUTS. It must also feature I2C to inter-
face the master modules and have a sufficient temperature range. Online vendor
Farnell provides an option suitable for these requirements, Texas Instrument’s
BQ34Z100 [51]. BQ34Z100 has impedance tracking for 3 V to 65 V batteries, self-
discharge and aging compensation. It has an operating temperature range of -40
to 85 ◦C. It can be interrogate by a host processor through commands returning
estimated remaining battery capacity, full charge capacity and average current,
and information is stored in non-volatile memory. It provides capacity predic-
tions within 1 % accuracy over its operating conditions and has the possibility of
tracking temperature with an negative temperature coefficient (NTC) thermistor.
Implementing BQ34Z100 close to NUTS’ battery pack will enable accurate battery
management by the acting master and make taking continuously measurements
with INA219 current monitor unnecessary.
5.2 Pass Time
Pass time is defined as the amount of time the satellite is visible from the ground
station. The average pass time over the ground station is simulated with the
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program System Tool Kit (STK) and is seen in Figure 5.1. The satellite does
approximately 15 orbits during 24 hours, but the ground station will not cover all
15 passes since some will be out of sight. Table 5.4 shows the number of passes
over Trondheim during a 24 hour window, with maximum, minimum and average
pass times. In order to achieve the maximum duration, the ground station must
track the satellite from horizon to horizon.
Figure 5.1: Ground station pass overs
Pass time is related to power consumption since radio communication will increase
while in contact with the ground station. It also relates to the beacon transmission
rate which must be high enough to guarantee received transmissions during a pass.
This thesis applies a pass time estimate of 10 minutes. As of 2014, the launch
details are not confirmed, making it impossible to know what type of orbit the
satellite will operate in. STK has the possibility of setting the cone of the ground
station which determines how the station sees the satellite. Since the ground
station is able to track the satellite from horizon to horizon, the value has been
set to 90◦, giving a maximum tracking area tangential to the curve of the Earth.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The simulations result in an average pass time of
12 minutes, but due to uncertainties regarding the station’s tracking capability, a
10 minute pass time for NUTS is a reasonable estimate.
Note from Table 5.4 that pass six is the last visible pass before an approximately
849.3 minute, or 14 hour, window until next visible pass.
5.3 Beacon Transmission Rate
In order to detect the satellite while in orbit, the satellite must transmit a beacon
signal making it possible to identify and track the satellite. Transmitting a beacon
signal unnecessary often consumes more power than needed, and in order to avoid
draining the battery, the beacon transmission rate must be adjustable.
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Figure 5.2: Ground station conic angle of 90◦
Table 5.4: Pass times over Trondheim during 24 hours
Pass Duration(min) Time to next pass
Hour Min
1 9.8309 1 27.60
2 12.5305 1 26.53
3 13.2478 1 26.42
4 13.2908 1 26.48
5 12.7696 1 27.22
6 10.6582 14 9.32
Minimum duration 9.8309 - -
Maximum duration 13.2908 - -
Average duration 12.0546 - -
Total duration 24 h 72.3275 - -
If the satellite has a low battery condition, the beacon transmission rate should be
decreased to a minimum, with a minimum given as at least two detectable beacon
transmissions in the 10 minute window over the ground station. The beacon
transmission has a length of one minute, and in order to achieve maximum one
detectable transmission, the beacon must transmit nine minutes apart as seen in
Figure 5.3. To guaranteed two detectable transmissions in a 10 minute window,
the beacon must transmit four minutes apart as seen in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.3: Beacon transmissions - one detectable transmission
5.3.1 Beacon Power Consumption
By defining three different levels for the beacon transmission rate, it is possible
to present an estimate of the beacon’s power consumption. The radio’s power
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amplifier (PA) is assumed to consume 1000 mA and each beacon transmission
has a length of one minute. Based on the estimated pass time of 10 minutes and
the minimum of two detectable transmissions, the lowest beacon rate is seen in
Figure 5.4. The beacon transmits four minutes apart to provide a minimum of
two detectable transmissions. A normal rate with four detectable transmissions
enables easier tracking without consuming more power than necessary. Normal
rate transmissions are seen in Figure 5.5, where the beacon transmits two minutes
apart. A full rate is needed when contact between satellite and ground station
has not yet been established. The beacon could transmit continuously, but at
the cost of heat generation in the power amplifier and high power consumption.
Transmitting 30 seconds apart as seen in Figure 5.6 reduces the power consumption
and the load on the power amplifier, while enabling easier tracking.
Low Rate
Equation 5.2 calculates the energy consumed when transmitting for one minute.
The power amplifier (PA) operates at 3.3 V.
E1 min =
1
60h · 1000 mA · 3.3V = 55 mWh (5.2)
At low rate, the beacon transmits for one minute, four minutes apart, as seen in
Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Beacon transmissions - low rate
The energy consumption for low rate is given in Equation 5.3, where the number
of transmissions per hour is multiplied with the power amplifier’s energy consump-
tion.
E@low =
60
5 · 55 mWh = 660 mWh (5.3)
The beacon’s energy consumption for the low rate is 660 mWh. The power con-
sumption becomes 660 mW.
Normal Rate
At normal rate, the beacon has the same transmission length of one minute as
before and the energy estimate in Equation 5.2 is valid for this rate as well. The
beacon rate is increased to transmit two minutes apart, as seen in Figure 5.5.
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The energy consumption is given in Equation 5.4, yielding an instantaneous power
consumption of 1100 mW, 66.67 % higher than low rate.
E@normal =
60
3 · 55 mWh = 1100 mWh (5.4)
Figure 5.5: Beacon transmissions - normal rate
Full Rate
At full rate, the beacon transmits 30 seconds apart as shown in Figure 5.6. Energy
consumption is given in Equation 5.5.
E@full =
60
1.5 · 55 mWh = 2200 mWh (5.5)
The average instantaneous power consumption becomes 2200 mW, 233.33 % higher
than low rate and 100 % higher than normal rate.
Figure 5.6: Beacon transmissions - full rate
5.4 Initial Mode
After the satellite is released from the P-POD and the antennas are deployed,
the beacon transmits at full rate enabling easier detection. The antenna release
mechanism consists of four resistance wires which melt thin nylon cords when
current is pushed through. The wires have a current consumption of about 350
mA each and it is assumed a maximum of five re-deployment attempts. Based on
data from HinCube 5, the time it will take to burn off the cords is close to 3 seconds,
making the power draw 3.85 mW per attempt and 19.25 mW for five attempts with
four wires. Detailed calculations can be found in Appendix D.1. Table 5.5 shows
the total power consumption before contact with the ground station, and it is
less than the normalized charging power of 3.205 W. External memories are not
5HinCube was built at Narvik University College. It was launched in 2014, but radio contact
was never made.
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included since these will not be used until after contact is made, and a worst case
consumption for the MCUs is used. Power consumption by the release mechanism
is not included since it is not used continuously. Given the normalized charging
power, the satellite can operate in this mode indefinitely. However, due to post-
ejection spin, a worst case charging scenario is possible, where power harvested
from the solar panels is only 1.534 W. This will drain the battery in close to 20
hours. After contact with the ground station, the beacon transmission rate is
adjusted based on system modes presented in Chapter 6, allowing the attitude
determination and control system (ADCS) to de-tumble the satellite.
Table 5.5: Initial mode’s average instantaneous power consumption
Component Operating voltage [V] Current draw [mA] Power consumption [mW]
Backplane 3.3 50 165
OBC MCU 3.3 100 330
Radio MCU 3.3 100 330
Power amplifier6 - - 2200
TOTAL - 914 3025
6Beacon operates at its highest rate
Chapter 6
Mission Event Plan -
Requirements
This chapter presents the requirements for the mission event plan. A thorough
mission event plan is necessary to ensure optimal performance and the possibility
of handling failures.
6.1 Different Modes
To efficiently respond to different events, the satellite should have defined modes,
making the system capable of handling different fault conditions, low power levels
and scheduled commands without the involvement of the ground station. Differ-
ent modes must have dedicated tasks based on the type of events the satellite
encounters. It is also important that commands from the ground station have the
possibility of overriding a current mode in case of unforeseen events.
To execute decisions based on remaining battery capacity, NUTS operates with
the following system modes:
• Critical mode - less than 25 % battery capacity
• Avoidance mode - between 25-50 % battery capacity
• Normal mode - between 50-100 % battery capacity
Remaining battery capacity will be reported by a battery fuel gauge implemented
near NUTS’ battery pack.
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6.2 After Ejection from P-POD
The railing switches are depressed while in the P-POD and the satellite is therefore
deactivated. After ejection from the P-POD, the switches will be released and the
satellite will be activated. Following the CubeSat specification, the antennas must
wait at least 30 minutes to deploy. As given by the project management, a first
time start up should be executed in the following order:
1. Deploy antennas
2. Start beacon signal
3. Wait for acknowledgement from ground station
4. Reattempt antenna deployment if no acknowledgement from the ground sta-
tion is received
5. De-tumble
It is important that the antennas deploy so that the ground station can receive
the beacon signal indicating an operational satellite. Several attempts of deploying
the antennas may be necessary if no acknowledgement is received from the ground
station.
6.3 In Orbit
If the antennas deploy successfully, the satellite is to monitor its own health and
execute received or stored commands. If the satellite encounters an issue, e.g. a
low battery condition, it should perform appropriate actions. The satellite must
continuously monitor submodules’ current draw as this can be an indication of
single event latchups (SELs).
6.3.1 Power Monitoring
Based on remaining battery capacity levels defined above, the satellite is allowed
to operate in one of three system modes. A mission plan should result in the
satellite being in normal system mode at all times, but loss of battery capacity
necessitates reduction of power consumption by entering an avoidance mode. If
the avoidance mode fails at increasing the battery level, a critical mode is initiated
where submodules are turned off and radio activity decreased.
Avoiding damaging temperature levels is also important to maintain an operational
satellite. For NUTS, a high temperature condition is treated as a critical system
mode since reducing power consumption reduces heat generation. Decreasing radio
activity reduces heat generated in the power amplifier and limiting submodules’
current draw also reduces the load on the regulators.
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6.3.2 Software Watchdog & Power Cycling
The software watchdog supervises other software tasks, taps the MCUs internal
watchdog and interfaces external modules responsible for current sensing, temper-
ature monitoring and battery monitoring. The internal watchdog can be tapped
unconditionally at higher frequency than an external watchdog and will handle
failures in task execution and code corruption caused by e.g., single event upsets
(SEUs). For NUTS, a software watchdog should be implemented on the on-board
computer (OBC) and Radio master modules and will be responsible for tapping an
external watchdog. Based on results from health checks and external monitors, the
software watchdog should initiate actions dependant on system state. If failures
are detected, it must attempt to recover the system before turning off the affected
submodules as a last resort.
A software watchdog must also enable the system to detect and respond to SEUs
and SELs. An SEU, which commonly results in a bit flip, is not a permanent
fault and refreshing the circuit will remove the error. An SEL is more critical
since recovery is dependent on removal of power and increased current flow could
ruin an IC if not handled in a timely manner. High current SELs can be detected
through the current-limit switches, but low current SELs might only be possible to
resolve by a periodic reset since these will be more difficult to detect. A thorough
current consumption estimate for each submodule will help in detecting SELs,
as software can compare actual to estimated values and thereby identify them.
A periodic reset of submodules could be sufficient in maintaining an operational
system, but situations could arise where a system wide reset is necessary. Before
issuing a system wide reset, the software watchdog must, when possible, initiate
a shutdown procedure in order to resume operations when power is brought back
on.
Power Cycling
The satellite’s hardware watchdog resets the system if it times out, and thereby
clearing any SELs. If a watchdog time-out occurs in the current design, the state of
the power modules and I2C repeaters are simply reset to a default on-state, which
is insufficient to recover from SELs. A period of time where power is disabled
to the affected module is necessary for the system to recover. Supply voltages
should be removed for a sufficient amount of time such that all voltages can reach
a ground potential of 0 V relative to the satellite’s ground plane. Rapidly resolving
all SELs are important in order to minimize the risk of permanent damage.
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Chapter 7
Mission Event Plan - Results
This chapter presents the mission event plans based on the requirements from
Chapter 6.
7.1 After Ejection from P-POD
Section 6.2 describes the procedure of deploying the antennas. The CubeSat speci-
fication states that the antennas can not be deployed until 30 minutes after ejection
from the P-POD and therefore it is necessary to use a 30 minute timer. An in-
dependent and redundant timer should provide a fail-safe if the first deployment
attempt fails. Two deployments attempts will therefore be performed after ejec-
tion. One timer should be implemented on the on-board computer (OBC) and
another on the Radio module. As described in Section 5.4, the power budget for
an initial mode estimates a total of five re-deployment attempts as to give a mar-
gin to the estimated power consumption. The mission plan describing this initial
mode can easily be expanded from two to five attempts if found necessary.
Figure 7.1 illustrates actions taken after ejection from the P-POD. A large concern
and a single point of failure are the railing deployment switches. If both switches
are broken or stuck, the satellite will not power up. If one or both switches are
released, power will be provided and the satellite activated. After the antennas
have deployed, the beacon signal is to transmit at the highest rate which makes it
easier to find and track the satellite.
At this point there may be an uncertainty as to whether or not the antennas have
deployed. If the antennas have not been deployed and the beacon is transmitting,
it could generate reflection, which is less than ideal for the system. However,
through discussion with project management, the need for establishing connection
with the ground station outweighs the risk of such reflections.
When the satellite has received an acknowledgement from the ground station, the
satellite should set a byte or a larger memory portion in order to avoid an attempt
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to re-deploy the antennas at a later stage due to a restart or power cycling. This
could be by reserving a page in the more radiation resistant FRAM. If the satellite
looses power or temporarily fails, it will know that the antennas are deployed
when the system is restored. This will prevent the satellite from waiting for a new
acknowledgement from the ground station.
If an acknowledgement has not been received, the satellite will attempt to re-deploy
its antennas. A valid command from the ground station will exit the satellite from
After ejection from P-POD mode. Receiving a valid command is also a criteria
for a mission success. As described in Section 5.2, a worst case interval from
last visible pass to the next, is approximately 14 hours. For normalized average
charging power, NUTS should be capable of sustaining this mode indefinitely, but
only for 20 hours if worst case charging power is used.
7.2 In Orbit
Figure 7.2 shows the default state of the satellite when the radio flag has been set.
When a command from the ground station is received, it is verified in order to
prevent execution of invalid commands. If the system does not succeed to execute
the command and has re-attempted it a certain amount of times, it should write a
log entry describing the failure. A log entry is also filed after successfully executing
the command.
7.2.1 Power Monitoring Mode
The power monitoring mode in Figure 7.3 shows the proposed plan for energy
conservation.
This mode constantly monitors NUTS’ remaining battery capacity through the
battery fuel gauge described in Section 5.1.1. When the battery falls below 50
% of remaining capacity, NUTS enters the avoidance mode defined in Section 6.1.
The beacon transmission rate is reduced and submodules’ current consumption are
measured. Submodules consuming more current than expected, are ask to reduce
their consumption and are turned off if they are unsuccessful in doing so. If the
satellite is not charging, critical mode will be initiated as shown in Figure 7.4.
In critical mode the beacon transmission rate is set its lowest rate and all submod-
ules are disabled. The Radio and OBC MCUs should reduce software tasks and
limit usage of external memories. The system checks the battery’s state of charge
and if is not charging it could be due to being in eclipse. If in eclipse, the satellite
must wait an estimated maximum of 35 minutes as described in Section 5.1. If it
is not in eclipse, the solar panels may not be at an optimal angle or one of the
sides can be broken. The satellite will try to adjust its position so that a different
solar panel is exposed. A possible issue is a live-lock condition where it is not
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charging while exposed to the Sun and tries to adjust attitude using the attitude
determination and control system (ADCS). This is the most critical of the possi-
ble battery situations and can indicate a complete failure of either solar panels,
charging mechanisms or sensors responsible for determining charging conditions or
Sun exposure. Damaged solar panels and broken chargers on the electrical power
system (EPS) are not recoverable by the system, and false readings from sensors
must be minimized by careful design and testing. If the ground station believes
that the sensors are providing false data, a way of overriding system modes must
be implemented.
7.2.2 Payload Verification
Figure 7.5 shows the proposed plan for the payload verification. The payload
only has to be verified when a command to activate it is received, and it should
otherwise be powered down. A functionality check of the payload module should
be performed first and a possible failure written to the log. The payload module
will then be restarted along with the verification procedure. If the module fails a
given number of times, an module error is written to the log. If the payload check
completes successfully, the command will be executed and an entry will be filed in
the log describing the command as successful.
7.2.3 Software Watchdog
Figure 7.6 shows a proposal for the software watchdog. It taps its own internal
watchdog to prevent a reset and performs health checks of all submodules. It
will also be responsible for checking for single event effects (SEEs), verifying other
software tasks and tap the external hardware watchdog. Figure 7.7 illustrates how
the submodules are checked by sending a control sequence in order to receive an
acknowledge. If the same sequences is received in return, the module is operational.
If the communication acknowledge or sequence is missing or incorrect, the module
is restarted. In order to prevent to live-lock, a loop limitation is introduced.
Check for SEEs can be seen in Figure 7.8 and attempts to discover any SEEs
present in the satellite. It first checks for any single event upsets (SEUs) and
performs a refresh of the module if any are detected. Checking for single event
latchups (SELs) requires to read the current consumption for all submodules, which
can be done from the INA219 current monitor. If an abnormal consumption is
register, power to the module is toggled, and it is written to log. If no abnormal
consumption is detected, the check is completed. For the software watchdog to
tap the external hardware watchdog, all components controlled by the hardware
watchdog must be verified. The software watchdog should not tap the hardware
watchdog if a component fails and the system can not resolve the issue by refreshing
or resetting the component. This conditional tapping will cause a power toggling
when software watchdog’s attempts are unsuccessful in resolving the issue.
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Figure 7.1: Mission Event Plan - After ejection from P-POD
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Figure 7.2: Mission Event Plan - Radio success
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Figure 7.3: Mission Event Plan - Power monitoring mode
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Figure 7.4: Mission Event Plan - Critical mode
Figure 7.5: Mission Event Plan - Payload verification
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Figure 7.6: Mission Event Plan - Software watchdog
Figure 7.7: Mission Event Plan - Check submodules
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Figure 7.8: Mission Event Plan - Check for SEEs
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Chapter 8
Design
This chapter presents design proposals for the satellite’s new hardware watchdog
system. Two solutions are presented and one is chosen for implementation on an
evaluation card.
8.1 Watchdog Requirements
As presented in Section 4.6, the existing watchdog circuit on the backplane is
insufficient with regards to recovering from single event latchups (SELs) and single
event upsets (SEUs). Code corruption in the MCUs as a result of SEUs may
cause the processors to enter a stuck state and therefore be in need of a reset or
power cycling. If this happens to both masters, there is currently no method for
resolving such issues. This necessitates a revision of the design aimed at meeting
new requirements.
A new watchdog must be able to restart both masters and provide the possibility
of removing power to all submodules as a final attempt to recover from failure.
It must also be as reliable and simple as possible. The existing backplane gives
the masters the possibility of removing power to each submodule, as well as the
other master module. However, it prevents a master of being able to turn itself off
and therefore a system wide toggling of power is not possible if both masters are
unresponsive. This can be solved by introducing a watchdog controlling a power
switch, e.g. the already applied MAX14523 current-limit switch. The watchdog
must not be able to turn itself off and not be a single point of failure. This is
possible in two ways; either as a watchdog using triple modular redundancy (TMR)
on the backplane or as two local watchdogs dedicated to each master module.
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8.2 Backplane Watchdog Solution
Having a single watchdog on the backplane resolves two unresponsive masters while
providing a redundant method of toggling power, but introduces a single point of
failure. Section 3.3.1 presents TMR which mitigates the issue of a watchdog circuit
as a single point of failure. By including three watchdogs and have their outputs
voted on, a more reliable design is possible. Care must be taken in ensuring
that a common property between the three watchdogs will not cause them to fail
simultaneously. Such properties could be changes in functionality as a result of
temperature fluctuations or radiation. A single signal TMR-voter often consists
of a limited number of simple logic gates and Section 3.3.1 describes the issue of
the voter as a possible single point of failure. Whether or not this is an acceptable
risk must be determined based on a final degree of redundancy and reliability for
the NUTS system.
Figure 8.1: Backplane watchdog proposal
Figure 8.1 shows a proposal with the three watchdog timer (WDT) circuits con-
nected to the MAX14523 current limit switches and interfaced by the on-board
computer (OBC) and Radio masters. A line for tapping the watchdogs within a
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defined time-out period and a manual reset line is included, along with the voter
circuit and its output. Since a new watchdog on the backplane is to monitor both
masters, there must also be possible for each master to tap each watchdog circuit.
If both masters are unresponsive, this would enable the watchdog to issue a system
wide reset. If only a single master was permitted to tap the watchdog circuits,
a permanent fault in that master would cause a continuous reset condition. One
unresponsive master is detected through a lack of communication response and
the functional master can toggle power to its partner through the backplane.
8.2.1 Majority Voter Circuit
In order to determine the correct output of the TMR watchdog system, a majority
voter must be implemented. The voter masks out a disagreeing member based on
the majority of the watchdog circuits. If two or more watchdog circuits agree on a
reset, the voter output should be low, in all other cases the output should be high.
Table 8.1 shows the voter’s truth table with the three outputs from the watchdogs
as A, B and C.
Table 8.1: Voter circuit truth table
A B C Reset
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
The truth table leads to the boolean equation:
Reset = A¯ ·B · C + A · B¯ · C + A ·B · C¯ + A ·B · C (8.1)
Table 8.2: Voter karnaugh diagram
ab
c 00 01 11 10
0
1
0 0 01
0 1 11
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Using the Karnaugh diagram in Table 8.2 and solving it for its minterms, a sim-
plified boolean equation is found:
Reset = A ·B +B · C + A · C (8.2)
Based on the result in Equation 8.2, one observes that the voter consists of three
2-port AND gates and one 3-port OR gate.
8.3 Local Watchdog Solution
Implementing a separate watchdog on each master module circumvents the need
for a watchdog on the backplane. Two local watchdogs cover the case of two unre-
sponsive masters and combined with the existing mechanism of removing power to
submodules, a system wide toggling of power is possible. With NUTS’ capability
of transferring control from the OBC to the Radio module, and vice versa, local
watchdogs does not introduce a single point of failure if implemented correctly.
By dividing the master modules into two power domains, it is possible to select
which components that are affected by a watchdog time-out. Figure 8.2 illustrates
this division where power to power domain B is provided through a watchdog con-
trolled switch. Components within domain B are subjects to the watchdog, while
components in power domain A are unaffected. It is required to place the watch-
dog in domain A as to prevent it from turning itself off. The backplane power
domain consists of existing design.
Figure 8.2: Local watchdog proposal
For the Radio module, components needed for radio transmissions are placed in
domain A so to prevent a broken watchdog from permanently silencing the satel-
lite. It is possible to place the module’s MCU and memories in domain B due
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to the functional redundancy between the Radio and OBC module. If one set of
memories and MCU have failed, the other master can inherit its partner’s tasks
and functionality. However, this does not apply to radio components and these
must therefore be kept in domain A. If radio components in domain A are in need
of power toggling, it is possible for the OBC module to remove power to the entire
Radio module through the backplane. This can also be done if the watchdog itself
is in need of power toggling.
Complete redundancy for the OBC module is present in the Radio module and
therefore all components on the OBC are placed in domain B. As before, the Radio
module can toggle power to both domains of the OBC module, and thereby also
toggle power to the watchdog, removing any SELs that may be present.
8.4 Watchdog Chip Selection
A new watchdog chip must be compatible with the existing 3.3 V supply, be
operational over a large temperature range and have a long power-on-reset (POR)
delay. A long POR delay is necessary to ensure that the system is powered off
long enough in order to recover from SELs. A manual reset option is favourable in
situations where a scheduled restart is necessary or in cases where one of the MCUs
are stuck in a live-lock where the watchdog is being tapped when it actually should
reset the system. The watchdog time-out period must also be long enough for the
system to stabilize and the master modules to come back online such that a restart
loop is avoided. Based on availability through the online vendors Digikey, Farnell
and Mouser, three candidates fitting the requirements were found. Table 8.3, 8.4
and 8.5 presents an overview of the voltage supervisors with built-in watchdog
timers from three different manufactures. All of the options operate with a 3.3 V
supply.
Table 8.3: Maxim Integrated - MAX16058 [12]
Manufacturer Maxim Integrated
Type Voltage supervisor w/ watchdog
POR delay 16 ms to 24 s
Watchdog time-out period 16 ms to 300 s
Voltage threshold Chip dependent
Operating temperature -40C to +125C
Order designator MAX16058ATA31+
Available Yes
Manual reset input Yes
The alternatives as presented all operate as both watchdog timers and voltage
supervisors/brownout detectors (BOD), meaning that if their supply voltage falls
below a certain voltage threshold, the circuit issues a reset. Based on information
in Tables 8.3 through 8.5, the Maxim options stands out with a wide temperature
range and substantially longer POR delay and watchdog time-out period than the
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Table 8.4: Intersil - ISL88708 [13]
Manufacturer Intersil
Type Voltage supervisor w/ watchdog
POR delay up to 2.4 s
Watchdog time-out period 1.6 s
Voltage threshold 3.09V
Operating temperature -40C to +85C
Order designator ISL88708IP83Z
Available Yes
Manual reset input Yes
Table 8.5: Texas Instruments - UCC2946 [14]
Manufacturer Texas Instruments
Type Voltage supervisor w/ watchdog
POR delay up to 200 ms
Watchdog time-out period up to 1.6 s
Voltage threshold Adjustable
Operating temperature -40C to +105C
Order designator UCC2946TPWRQ1
Available Yes
Manual reset input No
competitors. The Texas Instruments option does not feature a manual reset, while
Intersil has a rather high fixed voltage threshold and a more limited temperature
range. Therefore, Maxim’s MAX16058 is the chip of choice for the new watchdog.
It will be ordered with the designator MAX16058ATA31+ which, due to avail-
ability at vendors, has a 3.075 V voltage threshold. In the final implementation,
a chip with a different voltage threshold could be used, but for testing purposes,
the available 3.075 V is sufficient. The same watchdog circuit is used for both
solutions.
8.4.1 Maxim Integrated - MAX16058
Figure 8.3 show the top view with corresponding pins of the MAX16058 chip. All
following information is gathered fromMAX16058’s datasheet [12] unless otherwise
noted. The device has an active low reset signal which asserts when one of the
following conditions arise:
• At power-up when VCC rise above the voltage threshold
• When the supply voltage VCC falls below the voltage threshold
• When the manual reset pin is pulled low
• When the watchdog timer times out
The reset signal goes high an adjustable POR delay after all reset conditions are
de-asserted.
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Figure 8.3: MAX16058 supervisory circuit
MAX16058’s voltage threshold is chip dependent, and can be chosen between 1.575
V and 4.625 V in approximately 0.1 V increments. The threshold voltage has a 2.5
% accuracy over the entire temperature range, and Maxim Integrated recommends
the threshold set higher than the minimum supply voltage of ICs connected to the
chip [52].
The watchdog time-out period and POR delay are adjustable by using external
capacitors. Capacitor value CSRT for a POR delay tRP is given by Equation 8.3
CSRT =
tRP
5.15 · 106 (8.3)
The datasheet sets the minimum, typical and maximum tRP for a 2.7 nF CSRT as
follows:
• Minimum: 10.50 ms
• Typical: 14.18 ms
• Maximum: 17.00 ms
The minimum value is 25.95 % lower than the typical value, while the maximum
value is 19.88 % larger. No further information is given as to how, or if, the
deviation is dependent on the capacitance of the CSRT capacitor. Minimum, typical
and maximum values must be seen in relation to the tolerance of the capacitor
used such that the final deviation is manageable. E.g., a capacitor tolerance of 10
% will, as given by Equation 8.3, give a 10 % deviation of the tRP delay.
A watchdog time-out period of tWD requires the capacitor CSWT as given by Equa-
tion 8.4
tWD = Floor[
CSWT · 5.15 · 106
6.4 · 10−3s ] · 6.4 · 10
−3s+ 3.2 · 10−3s (8.4)
CSRT and CSWT are in farad, and tRP and tWD are in seconds. Floor[] is used
to take nearest lower integral value. All external capacitors must be low leakage
ceramic capacitor with low temperature coefficient, such as X7R. Equation 8.4 sets
58 CHAPTER 8. DESIGN
a typical value, but equations for minimum and maximum values are given in the
datasheet, and are as follows:
tWD_min = Floor[
CSWT · 4.16 · 106
9.5 · 10−3s ] · 3.5 · 10
−3s+ 1.6 · 10−3s (8.5)
tWD_max = Floor[
CSWT · 6.58 · 106
6.4 · 10−3s ] · 6.4 · 10
−3s+ 3.2 · 10−3s (8.6)
Minimum and maximum time-out periods will be evaluated for the chosen CSWT ,
and implementation should aim at keeping the time-out period for the three watch-
dogs as similar as possible. It is more difficult to evaluate the effect of capacitor
tolerances for the time-out period than for the POR-delay. This is due to the
Floor[] function which has a large influence on the calculation than the capacitor
tolerance. The minimum and maximum values of both time-out period and POR
delay are valid for the entire temperature range of -40◦C to +125◦C, but would for
a fixed temperature of 25◦C be closer to their typical values. However, as the satel-
lite is at risk of experiencing temperature fluctuation, worst case conditions should
be considered when implementing the final design. Both the time-out period and
the POR delay should be measured over a given temperature range.
The function of the different pins can be seen in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6: MAX16058 Pin functions
Pin Function
RESET Open-drain active low reset output
GND Ground
SWT Watchdog time-out input. Connect CSWT between this
pin and GND in order to adjust the watchdog time-
out period. Capacitance must be between 2275pF and
0.54µF to ensure valid operation
MR Active low manual reset input
SRT POR delay input. Connect CSRT between this pin and
GND in order to adjust the POR delay period. Capaci-
tance must be between 39pF and 4.7µF
WDI Watchdog input. A high to low transition within the
watchdog’s time-out period prevents a reset and clears
the timer. The timer also clears when RESET is as-
serted
WDS Watchdog select input. Connect to GND for normal
time-out mode or to VCC for multiplying the time-out
period tWD by a factor of 128
VCC 3.3V supply voltage
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For this implementation, the WDS pin is connected to VCC for a longer time-out
period and the results from Equations 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 must therefore be multiplied
by 128.
8.4.2 Watchdog Evaluation Card
Before a new hardware watchdog is implemented into the system, the design sug-
gestion is created as a separate evaluation card. This facilitates simpler testing
and interfacing with the MCUs without the need for a work-around on the current
backplane. The TMR solution is the more complicated of the two presented solu-
tions, and is therefore implemented on the evaluation card. Testing of the simpler
solution is still possible since they use the same watchdog circuit and have similar
operations.
To interface the two master modules, the card includes headers for the watchdog
input and manual reset lines, as well as connectors for the supply voltages. In
addition to the triplicated watchdog system and the voter, the card includes some
legacy design from the current NUTS backplane in order to enable more realistic
testing. The power OR-ing controller, LTC4413 gives the possibility of disabling
one of the two power supplies in order to simulate a misbehaving regulator on the
electrical power system (EPS). The card also uses the same adjustable current limit
switch, MAX14523 with a limit of 630 mA as on the existing backplane. Figure
8.4 shows the top view of the current limit switch along with its corresponding
pins.
Figure 8.4: MAX14523 current limit switch [10]
The pins of interest are FLAG, OUT and ON. OUT is the current limited output,
while FLAG is active low when an over-current or thermal shut down condition
arise [10]. A low signal on the ON pin turns the switch off, and hence removes
power to all modules that are connected to the OUT pin. In the current backplane
design, each module has two MAX14523 switches, one for 3.3 V and one for 5 V.
The ON pin is used to enable the masters to turn off each submodule as well as
the other master module. In order to keep late stage changes to the backplane
to a minimum, a possible connection for the watchdog system’s output is on the
MAX14523’s ON-pin. By doing so, two unresponsive masters or a manual reset
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signal causes the watchdog to issue a reset, which turns the MAX14523 switches
off, removing all power for a period of time given by Equation 8.3.
The logic gates constituting the majority voter are the same as the gates used
on the current backplane. Evaluation card’s hardware drawings can be seen in
Appendix G along with its corresponding bill of materials in Appendix G.2.
For the TMR solution, the new watchdog system must be capable of being tapped
by both masters. This leads to an issue since each watchdog circuit only has one
WDI pin for tapping. Having both masters directly drive MAX16058’s WDI pin
is not possible. With two asynchronous tapping signals, a condition where one
master pulls the line high while the other pulls it low, may occur. This leads to an
undefined level on the WDI pin, and correct functionality can not be guaranteed.
The issue is illustrated in Figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5: Undefined watchdog input signal
A form of buffer or driver is necessary so a high to low transition on the WDI pin
is guaranteed to occur before the watchdogs time out. By having the WDI pin
connected to the two masters’ WDI lines through an XOR-gate, a change on one of
two lines should cause a transition at the XOR-gate’s output. This solution causes
new issues if the XOR-gate is driven by two signals at the same frequency. Table
8.7 shows an XOR-gate’s truth table and gives a clue to these issues. If input A
and B where to change to a common or inverted value simultaneously, the gate’s
output would remain unchanged and not tap the watchdogs. Even though this
might be a rare condition, its effect could cause problems for the entire system.
Table 8.7: XOR-gate truth table
A B F
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
By having the XOR-gate driven by two signal at different toggling frequencies,
e.g. input A changes four times faster than input B, one is able to ensure that the
XOR-gate’s output changes as its inputs does. By selecting the toggling frequencies
based on the watchdogs’ time-out period, a high to low transition is guaranteed to
occur before an unnecessary reset occurs. Figure 8.6 illustrates different toggling
frequencies and a corresponding output. From the headers on the evaluation card,
the inputs going to the watchdogs are pulled high with resistors in order to avoid
floating inputs to the chips.
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Figure 8.6: XOR-gate timing diagram
The issue of having two masters driving one pin is also evident for the watchdogs’
manual reset inputs. This signal is active low and does not need to be toggled
within a certain interval. By including a 2-port AND gate with its input lines
pull up by resistors, a low signal from one or two of the masters causes the gate’s
output to go low, leading to a manual reset. The new triplicated watchdog system
with voter and logic gates can be seen in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7: Triple modular redundancy watchdog system as implemented on the
evaluation card
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Chapter 9
Testing & Results
This chapter presents testing and results of the watchdog evaluation card. The
evaluation card was manufactured at the ELPRO lab at NTNU.
9.1 Hardware Watchdog Verification & Test
The watchdog evaluation card was implemented with a power-on-reset (POR)
delay of 1.6995 s by choosing a CSRT of 330 nF as given by Equation 8.3. The
CSWT capacitors were set to 3.3 nF. Based on Equation 8.4, a 3.3 nF capacitor
should yield a typical time-out period of 2.048 s. The time-out period and POR
delay were chosen such to enable an oscilloscope to capture an entire sequence of
events from, e.g. the inputs ceased to toggle until the watchdogs timed out.
Feedback is given through two LEDs; LED0 indicates connected supply power
and LED1 is connected to MAX14523’s output indicating whether or not power is
turned off when a reset, time-out or brownout occurs.
The finished evaluation card can be seen in Figure 9.1. The test setup is seen in
Appendix F along with an overview of the test equipment.
9.1.1 Tests
The tests chosen for the evaluation card are presented in Table 9.1 along with
defined success criteria. The test setup included two Atmel UC3-A3 Xplained
cards which feature the same microcontoller as used by NUTS. These will act
as the two master modules. For all tests, the microcontrollers ran a simple task
toggling a GPIO-pin at a frequency of 5 Hz for card A and 1.25 Hz for card B. The
5 Hz signal would cause a high to low transition on the watchdogs’ input (WDI)
each 0.2 s and the 1.25 Hz signal each 0.8 s, both being well within the time-out
period of 2.048 s. The frequencies were chosen such that one or more high to
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Figure 9.1: Watchdog evaluation card
low transitions were to happen before the time-out period. For a shorter time-
out period, higher frequencies would have been applied to the WDI inputs. The
GPIO-pins were connected to the evaluation card through on-board headers, while
the manual reset lines were pulled to ground using a jumper when needed. Signals
of interest were measured with an oscilloscope, which also provided screenshots
and cursor measurements. The tests were carried out at room temperature.
Table 9.1: Evaluation card tests and success criteria
Test Method Success criteria
Power up Connect 3.3 V from power supply Status LED0 on, measured 3.3 V,
LED1 on after POR delay
XOR-gate toggling Lines driving WDI at two different frequencies Several high to low transitions at
gate’s output
XOR-gate toggling Driving both WDI lines with the same signal No change at gate’s output
Manual reset High to low transition on manual reset line LED1 off immediately
Manual reset Low to high transition on manual reset line LED1 on after POR delay
Toggling of both WDI lines Both WDI lines connected and toggling Time-out event does not occur.
LED1 remains on
Toggling of single WDI line One WDI line disconnected Time-out event does not occur.
LED1 remains on
Watchdog time-out Cease WDI toggling from both microcontrollers After time-out period: LED1 off.
After restart delay: LED1 on
Voter circuit Disable one watchdog Output of voter remains high
Voter circuit Disable two watchdog Output of voter goes low
Power OR-ing Remove one of two power supplies Continued operation - LED0 re-
mains on
Brownout detection Gradually lower supply voltage LED1 off
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9.1.2 Results
During manufacturing the LTC4413 power OR-ing chip was rotated 180◦ which
prevented testing of its functionality, but due to extra headers it was possible to
power the rest of the card without affecting the other tests. A summary of the
test results are given in Table 9.2.
Appendix G presents additional results not presented in this section.
Table 9.2: Evaluation card test results
Test Result Figure Comments
Power up Success Figure 9.2 Supply voltages measured to be 3.3 V
XOR-gate toggling Success Figure 9.3 Correct behaviour for tapping the watchdogs
XOR-gate toggling Success Figure 9.4 Incorrect behaviour for tapping the watchdogs
Manual reset Success Figure 9.5 Measured POR delay of 1.66 s
Toggling of both WDI lines Success Figure 9.6 -
Toggling of single WDI line Success Figure 9.7 -
Watchdog time-out Success Figure 9.8 Measured time-out period of 2.59 s to 2.96 s
Voter circuit Success Figure 9.10 One disabled watchdog
Voter circuit Success Figure 9.11 Two disabled watchdogs
Power OR-ing Fail - LTC4413 power OR-ing misplaced
Brownout detection Success - Threshold voltage at 3.08 V
Power-up
The first test preformed was a power-up test and the result can be seen in Figure
9.2 where the 3.3 V supply voltage is seen (above - CH1) along with the output of
the voter (below - CH2). The voter output rises high after a POR delay of 1.66 s,
2.32 % lower than calculated value of 1.6995. The output will remain high until
either a manual reset occurs or the watchdogs time out.
XOR-gate Toggling
Section 8.4.2 presents several issues as to how to tap the watchdogs. Attempting
to drive the watchdogs’ WDI inputs with two directly connected lines causes un-
defined levels on the inputs. This is not sufficient for guaranteeing a high to low
transition on the watchdogs’ WDI inputs within their time-out period. The imple-
mented solution was to include XOR-gates as drivers for the WDI inputs. Figure
9.3 shows an XOR-gate’s inputs (above & middle - CH1 & CH2) and output (below
- CH3). Driving the inputs at two different frequencies will cause several high to
low transitions required for tapping the watchdogs within their time-out period, as
well as avoiding undefined levels at their inputs. The optimal tapping frequencies
can be determined based on the design’s final time-out period.
An issue which could arise if the tapping frequencies are identical, or close to
identical, is the lack of a valid change at an XOR-gate’s output. This is illustrated
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Figure 9.2: Power-up test - Supply voltage (CH1) & output of voter (CH2)
Figure 9.3: WDI input signals at 5 Hz (CH1) and 1.25 Hz (CH2) driving an
XOR-gate with output (CH3)
in Figure 9.4 where the same signal is used to drive both inputs (above & middle -
CH1 & CH2) causing no transitions at the output (below - CH3). Evidently, this
will not tap the watchdogs and thereby cause a reset. Another scenario where the
XOR-gates are removed is presented in Appendix G.1.
Manual Reset
A measured POR delay of 1.7 s can be seen in Figure 9.5. Pulling the manual reset
line to ground caused an immediate high to low transition on the voter output.
The release of the manual reset line (below - CH2) is followed by a low to high
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Figure 9.4: Synchronous WDI input signals (CH1 & CH2) and output of XOR-gate
(CH3)
transition on the voter output (above - CH1) after a 1.7 s delay. The voter output
will be held low as long as the manual reset line is low.
Figure 9.5: POR delay from release of manual reset line (CH2) to voter output
transition (CH1)
WDI Line Toggling
Figure 9.6 shows the ideal situation where both masters toggle their respective
WDI lines and prevent a time-out from occurring. This is the expected condition
when both masters are operating as intended.
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Figure 9.6: Output of voter (CH1) remains high as both WDI inputs are being
toggled (CH2 & CH3)
When one master becomes unresponsive and ceases to toggle its WDI line, the
situation becomes as shown in Figure 9.7. The voter output remains high (above
- CH1) even though the 1.25 Hz WDI toggling line (middle - CH2) is disabled
and only the faster 5 Hz WDI line (below - CH3) remains active. Note that CH2
remains high as a result of the implemented pull-up resistors.
Figure 9.7: Output of voter (CH1) remains high as one WDI input is disabled
(CH2) and the other toggles (CH3)
If the last functioning master becomes unresponsive and ceases to toggle its WDI
line, the watchdog system will issue a reset after the time-out period as shown in
Figure 9.8. After the last high to low transition of the 5 Hz WDI line (below -
CH3), the voter output (above - CH1) goes low after a period of approximately
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2.64 s, 28.9 % higher than typical time-out period. A time-out period of 2.96 s,
44.5 % higher than typical, is shown in Figure 9.9 where the 5 Hz WDI line is
disabled and the slower 1.25 Hz ceases to toggle. The different time-out periods as
measured at the voter output is due to chip specific differences in each watchdog’s
time-out period. Measurements seen in Appendix G.1 shows differences in time-
out periods of 2.58 s and 3.28 s, respectively 25.98 % and 60.16 % higher than the
typical value of 2.048 s.
Figure 9.8: Watchdog time-out with voter output transitions low (CH1) as toggling
ceases on last active WDI input (CH3) with one WDI input disabled (CH2)
Figure 9.9: Watchdog time-out after slow WDI line cease to toggle - Voter output
(CH1), WDI input lines (CH2 & CH3)
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Voter
Correct functionality of the voter was ensured by removing the supply voltage
from one of the three watchdogs. The three reset outputs of the watchdogs can be
seen in the three signals from the top (CH1, CH2 & CH3) along with the output
of the voter (bottom CH4) in Figure 9.10. The disabled watchdog’s output is at 0
V and shows no transition as seen in CH2 (second from the top). Note the delay
of 44 ms from the watchdog’s first transition (above - CH1) until the transition of
the third watchdog and the voter output. As with the first POR delay measured,
this is 2.32 % lower than the calculated value. This may be due to chip differences
or capacitance differences between the three watchdogs. The capacitors used to
adjust the delays have a 10 % tolerance which along with the deviations described
in Section 8.4.1, may account for uneven delays.
Figure 9.10: Voter output (CH4) and watchdogs’ RESET output (CH1, CH2 &
CH3). One watchdog disabled (CH2)
By removing the supply voltage from two of three watchdogs, the voter output was
to remain low at all times. This is shown in Figure 9.11 with signals as described
for Figure 9.10. The only active watchdog is seen at the top of the figure (CH1).
Brownout Detector
The voltage supervisory function, or brownout detector, of the watchdogs was
tested by slowly decreasing the evaluation card’s supply voltage. Multimeter mea-
surements showed a threshold voltage of 3.08 V, 0.16 % higher than the typical
threshold of 3.075 V and well within the chip’s 2.5 % accuracy. The reset signal
will be active low for as long as the supply voltage is below the threshold and is
guaranteed to be valid for supply voltages down to 1.1 V [12].
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Figure 9.11: Voter output (CH4) and watchdogs’ RESET output (CH1, CH2 &
CH3). Two watchdogs disabled (CH2 & CH3)
Current Consumption
For integration into the backplane, the LEDs will be removed and the power OR-
ing chip and current limit switch are already in place. This leaves three watchdog
chips, three XOR-gates, six AND-gates and one OR-gate with current consumption
as shown in Table 9.3. These values are based on maximum current consumption
values from the ICs’ datasheets.
Table 9.3: Current consumption - Watchdog evaluation card
Chip # µA Total µA
MAX16058 3 0.415 1.245
2-input AND 6 200 1200
3-input OR 1 200 200
2-input QUAD XOR 1 20 20
Total 11 - 1421.245
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9.2 Battery Management
Three system modes were defined in Section 6.1:
• Critical mode - less than 25% battery capacity
• Avoidance mode - between 25-50% battery capacity
• Normal mode - between 50-100% battery capacity
Conditions for the three modes must be given as a part of a battery management
framework. The framework is divided into the three scenarios critical, avoidance
and normal. It aims at keeping the satellite in normal mode at all times and in
a situation where the solar panels deliver more power than what is consumed.
A framework implementation assumes the use of a battery fuel gauge capable of
providing remaining battery capacity.
Section 7.2.1 presents actions necessary to prevent the satellite from completely
discharging its battery. Together with calculations from Chapter 5, it forms the
basis for the battery management framework presented below.
9.2.1 Critical Mode
Critical mode is as described in the mission event planning Section 7.2.1 and Figure
7.4. In this mode the remaining battery capacity is 25% or less. No subsystems are
allowed to be active and the beacon rate is set to minimum, meaning the satellite
will transmit a beacon signal four minutes apart. At its minimum, the beacon
consumes 660 mW and with only the on-board computer (OBC), backplane and
Radio module active, the total power consumption becomes approximately 1.485
W. Use of external memories are not permitted. A value for the attitude deter-
mination and control system (ADCS) has not been included, since a final imple-
mentation is not in place. For readjusting the attitude as an attempt to increase
charging power, the ADCS must be given a runtime high enough to sufficiently
change attitude, but without draining the battery further. Section 5.1 calculates
the normalized charging power to 3.205 W, which is 1.720 W higher than the con-
sumption. Calculations found in Appendix E estimates that the satellite charges
from a completely discharged battery to full capacity in approximately 17 hours,
given a linear charging characteristic. From a battery at 25 % remaining capacity,
a charge time of approximately 4 hours is necessary to reach 50 % capacity. The
satellite will stay in this mode until the battery has reached 50 %, after which
normal mode operations will commence.
9.2.2 Avoidance Mode
Avoidance mode attempts to reduce the power consumption of the modules before
turning them off. This is to avoid entering critical mode prematurely which greatly
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inhibits on the satellite’s functionality. The battery is at 25-50% of full capacity
and the beacon transmission rate is set to its minimum value. The power con-
sumption for all modules are measured to determine if they consume more power
than what is allowed. If a module is found to consume too much power, it is told
to reduce its consumption or it will be restarted to reduce consumption caused by
either rouge software or a single event latchup (SEL). If this does not cause a net
charging state of the battery, critical mode will be initiated.
9.2.3 Normal Mode
Normal mode applies from 50-100% of remaining battery capacity. No power-
saving restrictions apply for the submodules and periods of time where the satellite
consumes more energy than it generates, are allowed. The beacon transmission
rate is set to normal causing its power consumption to increase to 1.100 W, 66.67
% higher than its consumption in avoidance and critical mode. Normal mode’s
worst case power consumption is 4.442 W as calculated in Appendix E, 199.1 %
higher than critical mode. The OWL radio is not included since its protocol and
activity level has not yet been decided.
Example of Basis State
By assuming a certain runtime per hour for each module and a given beacon
transmission rate, it is possible to estimate energy consumption for a basis state
where the satellite should generate more energy than it consumes. Table 9.4 shows
such an example. The typical current consumption of 30.4 mA from Section 4.1 is
used for the OBC and Radio MCUs, which gives approximately a 100 mW power
consumption. NAND flash and FRAM power consumptions are doubled compared
to Table 5.1 in Section 5.1, since the memories are present both on the OBC and
Radio module.
Table 9.4: Estimated basis state
Component Power consumption [mW] Runtime [h] Energy consumption [mWh]
Backplane 165 1 165
OBC MCU 100 1 100
Radio MCU 100 1 100
NAND Flash 198 0.1 1.98
FRAM 132 0.1 1.32
Power amplifier1 3300 - 1100
TOTAL - - 1468.3
Only components and modules which are either always on or used often, are in-
cluded. The attitude determination and control system (ADCS) can be granted a
degree of autonomy as long as net charge is positive. Full use of the ADCS is an
1Beacon transmissions at normal rate
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exception to the base state since it is only necessary to perform complete attitude
adjustment when pointing the camera or as an attempt to change exposed solar
panels. The OWL radio is also omitted since it is only active when transmitting
telemetry or image data to the ground station. As an example, external FRAM
and NAND flash memories are permitted to run 1 % of the time, since frequent
logging and backup may be necessary. The example presented in Table 9.4 shows
a energy consumption of approximately 1.468 Wh, 1.737 Wh lower than the nor-
malized charging of 3.205 Wh. This margin can be increased by using the lowest
beacon transmission rate. However, the example illustrates the need for careful
battery management in order to avoid a basis state where net charging is negative,
which over time will cause the satellite to abort normal mode operations and enter
avoidance or critical mode.
A coding proposal for the presented battery management framework is presented
in Appendix C.
Chapter 10
Discussion
This chapter presents the discussion related to the new watchdog system, battery
management and mission event planning.
10.1 Hardware Watchdog
The evaluation card designed in Section 8.4.2 has been tested and found to operate
as intended. For both solutions, the time-out period, power-on-reset (POR) delay
and brownout detector (BOD) threshold voltage must be selected. For a backplane
watchdog solution, also the watchdog input (WDI) toggling frequencies must be
selected.
10.1.1 Brownout Detector Threshold Voltage
The voltage supervisory function of the MAX16058 is an added benefit of the chip
since it is the watchdog timer that is its main function in this design. The Atmel
MCUs have an internal BOD with a threshold of 2.7 V, 18 % lower than the 3.3
V supply. Maxim Integrated recommends having a threshold voltage higher than
that of connected ICs. This sets the MAX16058’s threshold higher than 2.7 V.
Atmel recommends the threshold voltage of an external BOD to be set 5 - 15 %
lower than the typical supply voltage of 3.3 V [53], which gives an interval of 2.805
V to 3.135 V. Adjusted for MAX16058’s 2.5 % accuracy, the interval is 2.875 V to
3.057 V, of which Maxim Integrated offers two possibilities with a typical threshold
voltage of 2.925 V and 3.000 V. The final choice may be based upon availability.
10.1.2 Power-On-Reset Delay
Section 3.2.2 presents the time necessary to clear a single event latchup (SEL)
as between 4.7 µs and 300 ms. This is related to the length of the POR delay
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which must be sufficient for all voltages to reach the ground potential of 0 V.
Performed tests used an arbitrary POR delay of approximately 1.7 s and measure-
ments showed actual delays within 2.32 % of the calculated value, which is well
within the deviations as described in Section 8.4.1. A final decision of its length
can not be made based solely on an evaluation card. Measurements of module
voltages in the final pre-flight model must form the basis for determining the nec-
essary length of the POR delay. Deviations caused by capacitor tolerances and
temperature fluctuations must be taken into account for this final value.
10.1.3 Time-out Period
The time-out period is adjustable from 16 ms to 300 s, and a reasonable value must
be selected for this design. The 3.3 nF CSWT capacitor used on the evaluation card
gave a typical time-out period of 2.048 s, while the measured period ranged from
2.58 s s to 3.28 s, respectively 25.98 % and 60.16 % higher than the typical value.
The theoretical minimum value from Equation 8.5 is 0.65 s, with a maximum
value of 7.98 s as given by Equation 8.6. Deviation from the typical value is 68.26
% lower for minimum and 289 % higher for maximum. Note that these are the
absolute worst case values over the entire temperature range for the chip, -40◦C to
+125◦C. It is especially the minimum value that must be controlled since a large
shift could cause unintended resets.
A new hardware watchdog system is used as a last resort when the active master
has exhausted all other options for recovering the system. Code corruption or
failures in task execution will be handled by the MCUs’ internal watchdog, and
as for single event latchups (SELs) and single event upsets (SEUs) external to the
MCUs, the software watchdog should mitigate these. This supports the argument
for a long time-out period. A long period is also necessary to prevent a reset-loop
as a result of a long stabilization time, which for the Atmel MCUs can be as much
as 1.2 s [37], and a short period. It must also provide enough time for the system to
attempt to recover itself and log its current condition before a system wide reset.
Reduced overhead for the MCUs is also an argument for a long period. With a
long period, the hardware watchdog may be tapped conditionally only after the
system has passed certain health checks. This will prevent tapping the hardware
watchdog without being certain that the submodules are functioning.
For the NUTS system, time-out periods as high as the maximum value of 300 s
should be suitable to accommodate the functionality as described above. Con-
sidering the large deviations of both time-out periods and POR delays, thorough
tests of the finished pre-flight test model and flight model must be conducted after
the final values are selected. This includes thermal vacuum tests needed to ensure
that variations between desired and actual periods and delays, also between each
watchdog chip, is not likely to cause failures in orbit. Time-out periods and POR
delays must be chosen such that the new watchdog system serves its purpose at
each extreme of the expected temperature variations.
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10.1.4 Watchdog Input Toggling Frequencies
For a backplane watchdog, the WDI toggling frequencies must also be determined.
Frequencies with which the master modules are to toggle the hardware watchdog,
must be based on the minimum time-out period as given by Equation 8.5. This is
in order to avoid unintentional resets. The XOR-gate at the watchdog inputs must
be driven by signals at two different frequencies in order to produce a valid high to
low transition at its output within the time-out period. Each frequency must be
high enough to tap the watchdog by itself if the other master ceases to toggle its
WDI line. During testing the frequencies were separated by a factor of 4, which
produced desirable results. The lowest frequency must have a shorter period than
the watchdogs’ time-out period, and using a 13 or a
1
4 of the time-out period gives
some margin towards preventing a time-out. This results in the highest frequency
having a period between a 112 or a
1
16 of the time-out period.
10.1.5 Manual Reset Option
Through testing and evaluation of the overall functionality of the watchdog system,
it has been decided to remove the possibility of a manual reset. This is due to
the possible issue of one of the masters continually pulling its reset line low, even
after power cycling. This would keep the system in permanent reset and power
will never be brought back on. This is not an issue when only using the time-out
function, since a master misusing or disabling its WDI line will not effect the other
master nor cause a continuous reset condition. The possibility of a remotely revoke
reset is still present through the option of transmitting a command ordering the on-
board computer (OBC) and Radio to cease toggling of the WDI lines. This causes
the watchdogs to time out and would be a last resort in an attempt to recover
from SELs which have not been resolved through power cycling of submodules.
Overall, the risk of misusing the manual reset option has been deemed larger than
its benefit, especially since the same functionality is redundantly present through
the time-out function of the watchdogs. It also removes the single point of failure
related to a stuck manual reset signal. Power cycling of one of the two masters
is possible by removing power to the module through the backplane whenever a
master fails a health check or fails to answer a communication attempt from its
partner.
10.1.6 Backplane Watchdog Solution
For a backplane watchdog there are two major issues, namely how to best incor-
porate the design into the existing backplane and how to make it as reliable as
possible. Incorporation concerns are from where the new ICs should receive sup-
ply voltages, where and how the voter output should be connected and how to
combine it with existing hardware and signals.
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Supply Voltage
As for providing power to the new ICs, there exists two options; use one of the
two redundant 3.3 V supplies from the electrical power system’s (EPS) regulators
or from a LTC4413 power OR-ing chip on the backplane. If the ICs are powered
directly from the EPS, the existing redundancy of two independent regulated volt-
ages is left unused and a faulty regulator will leave the ICs unpowered. Powering
the ICs after the power OR-ing will take advantage of the redundant power supply
and the loss of one regulator will not inhibit on continued operation, making this
a desirable approach. If this single LTC4413 chip fails, the watchdog system will
be disabled as a whole and it will no longer be necessary to toggle the WDI lines
to prevent a reset. By including a pull up resistor on the voter output, the reset
signal is pulled high and the power to the rest of the satellite will remain on and
be otherwise unaffected.
Since the new watchdog is based on triple modular redundancy (TMR), pow-
ering the triplicated ICs from three LTC4413s will further improve redundancy
with each replica of the MAX16058 watchdog chip and its watchdog input (WDI)
XOR-gates receiving supply voltage from a power OR-ing chip. Compared to the
simpler solution described above, this will enable the watchdog system to operate
as intended if one LTC4413 chip fails. Challenges which must be considered in
the final pre-flight test model is the risk of short circuits and crossing lines when
increasing the number of separate power lines on an already populated PCB, and
hence the simpler solution with less routing of power lines may be desirable.
Incorporation into Existing Backplane
The new watchdog system has been design to provide an active low reset signal
at its output whenever the watchdogs time out or the supply voltage drops below
a certain threshold. For the system to be useful in the backplane, the ideal in-
terconnection of the output and existing hardware must be found. The backplane
already provides a mechanism for disabling power to separate submodules as seen
in Appendix B and in Figure 10.1. E.g. in the case for Module 8, this is done
by pulling the ON pin on the MAX14523 current-limit switch to ground using the
PWR_ON# signal and thereby removing power at its output. Since the main
goal of the new watchdog is to reset unresponsive masters and remove SELs, it is
possible to connect its output to the current-limit switches located at each module
connector. This will cause a global reset with a delayed start, a power-on-reset
delay, cycling the power to both master modules. By connecting the watchdog’s
output to the backplane’s own MAX14523 switch, the satellite now has the possi-
bility of restarting the backplane logic as well, removing any SELs left unresolved
by the old design, solving the issue described in Section 4.6.
Since both signals are active low, the simplest way of combining the watchdog’s
output with the existing PWR_ON# signal is through a 2-input AND-gate located
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at each module’s current-limit switch. This keeps the possibility of independently
cycling power to the submodules while also enabling a global cycling of power.
Figure 10.1 shows a possible way of implementing the design into the backplane.
Figure 10.1: Possible implementation for a backplane watchdog
Considerations for Increased Reliability
On the evaluation card, the three XOR-gates connected to the watchdogs’ WDI
inputs are all a part of a single IC consisting of four 2-input XOR-gates, where
one is left unused. In the final implementation, it is recommended to use three
XOR-gates, each on a separate IC, when interfacing the watchdogs. This will
require more real estate on the backplane, but will prevent a failure in the IC from
disabling the entire satellite. As a result, one XOR-gate and one watchdog circuit
can fail or loose power without effecting the other watchdogs and the rest of the
satellite.
10.1.7 Local Watchdog or Backplane Watchdog
By using TMR for a backplane watchdog system, the watchdog as a single point
of failure in itself is resolved, but the necessary voter creates a new one. How far
to extend the design towards optimal redundancy and reliability must be weighed
against its usefulness to the project, time and resource constraints, as well as mis-
sion lifetime. A final degree of reliability and redundancy must be determined in
order to avoid an unnecessary increase in complexity. It is natural to discuss if a
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triple modular redundancy (TMR) watchdog system is necessary, or if it overcom-
plicates the design. NUTS’ mission lifetime is of such a limited period (3 months)
that the probability of a critical failure is reduced compared to longer missions.
It is none the less desirable to have some form of mechanisms in place capable of
resetting the system as a last resort upon a failure. It is given by the problem
description that such a mechanism, if malfunctioning, is not to leave the satellite
non-operational, which is where a backplane watchdog solution falls short. The
voter remains a single point of failure unless it is duplicated to each place where its
output is used. With four ICs in the voter, this rapidly increases components count
and amount of signalling and power lines needed on the backplane, which again
increases the total amount of possible failures. A local watchdog solution adds a
MAX16058 chip and a power switch to each master module without changes to
the backplane. A backplane watchdog solution required dedicated lines for man-
ual reset and watchdog toggling, while local watchdogs only rely on connections
on-board the module card. As a total, the backplane solution adds 11 ICs and has
higher degree of complexity than the local watchdog solution. By avoiding logic
gates in the voter and at the watchdogs’ inputs, the local solution using only two
MAX16058 chips, has a lower current consumption as seen in Table 9.3 in Section
9.1.2. Due to its simplicity and desirable functionality, the local watchdog solution
is the preferred solution and is recommended for implementation in the pre-flight
test model.
10.2 Battery Management
Section 5.1 presents estimates for charging power from the solar cells. An ad-
justable beacon transmission rate helps the satellite to maintain a healthy battery
state and it is controlled by the system modes and ground station.
10.2.1 Power Estimation
Based on the defined beacon rates, it is unnecessary to use the beacon at full
rate other than for the initial mode. The 100 % increase in power consumption
compared to normal rate, will drain the battery quicker and reduce submodules’
runtime. In a worst case situation, as much as 14 hours can separate two visible
passes over the ground station. Estimates from Section 5.4 shows that for a worst
case charging condition, the battery can drain in close to 20 hours. If contact
is not established during the six visible passes, there is another 14 hours until
next possible attempt. Therefore, a high beacon transmission rate can reduce the
chance of establishing contact with the ground station, given that the battery can
be discharged before the next visible pass occurs. Project management has to
decide if this is an acceptable risk, or if the beacon should transmitting at low or
normal rate in order to make the battery last longer, at the cost of fewer detectable
transmissions. Applying the lowest transmission rate reduces initial mode’s power
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consumption by 49.1 % to 1.485 W, less than the worst case charging power of
1.535 W, meaning the satellite should be able to sustain this mode indefinitely.
Regardless, the ground station should have the possibility of overriding any mode,
both for beacon rates and system modes.
A final implementation of the battery management should result in a basis state
where the satellite is fully operational, and where the net charge over a given
time period is positive and large enough to keep the battery at more than 50 %
capacity. An example of such a basis state is given in Table 9.4 in Section 9.2.3,
where the net charging is large enough to grant a certain degree of autonomy to the
submodules. If applying the lowest beacon rate is acceptable, power consumption
by the power amplifier can be reduced by 40 % from its normal rate. More net
charge that is available, the higher the degree of autonomy can be given to the
attitude determination and control system (ADCS) and payload.
10.2.2 Discharge Considerations
In order ensure that the battery does not reach its depth of discharge (DoD), the
battery must be monitored constantly. It is up to the battery management to avoid
reaching the critical mode defined as 25 % or less remaining capacity. For this to
be possible, accurate battery measurements are necessary, e.g. from a battery fuel
gauge. The same applies to battery charging. If the battery overcharges it could
destroy the battery pack and it is therefore important to stop charging when full
capacity is reached. Section 5.1.1 presents a suitable battery fuel gauge which is
capable of accurately reporting both remaining and full battery capacity. Project
management must decide whether or not to implement a fuel gauge, but it is
recommended that its functionality is in place for the pre-flight test model.
10.2.3 Solar Cells
Charging power for the solar cells have been calculated based on ideally values from
its datasheet. The solar cells become less effective due to irradiation and random
solar flares. A worst case reduction in efficiency is about 8.79 %, which causes a
normalized charging power of 2.923 W instead of 3.205 W. If this reduction will
take place during NUTS’ mission life time is not possible to predict due to the
random nature of irradiation and solar flares.
Estimates in this thesis applies an average case charging power per orbit based
on a worst case beta angle of 0◦. Charging power per orbit was adjusted to a
normalized charging power based on ratio between time exposed to the Sun and
in eclipse. This made it possible to compare power generation and consumption.
In a best case scenario, the normalized charging will more than double to 7.514
W, since the satellite will be exposed to the Sun throughout its orbit.
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10.3 Mission Event Planing
Throughout this thesis, the mission event plans have evolved. Chapter 7 presents
several possible mission event plans for NUTS. Through flowcharts and discussion,
proposals aimed at increasing reliability by handling power conditions, payload ver-
ification and single event effects (SEEs) efficiently, are presented. The release of the
deployment switches and the antenna deployment after ejection from the P-POD,
are the most critical events NUTS encounter. Stuck deployment switches are an
inherent risk of the P-POD solution of delivering CubeSats to orbit, which can not
be mitigated by a mission event plan. Antenna deployment can not be guaranteed
due to possible mechanism failures, but this risk can be reduced through multiple
redeployment attempts. The NUTS project has evaluated different methods of
detecting deployed antennas, but has not decided which, if any, methods to im-
plement. A detection mechanism would prevent transmitting the beacon signal
if the antennas have not been deployed, thereby preventing harmful reflection in
the radio components. The current solution of multiple reattempts is the sim-
plest solution, one that does not cause false indication of whether deployment was
successful or not. Since radio communication is essential, the effect of possible
reflections must be evaluated before launch.
10.3.1 Periodic Restarts
It is possible to plan for periodic restarts of the satellite in order to resolve single
event effects (SEEs) which is not detected by the software watchdog. The on-board
computer (OBC) can remove power to each submodule one after the other, while
the Radio module can remove power to the OBC. Power should not be completely
removed from the Radio module, since this will silence the satellite. If the MCU
or memories on the Radio module are in need of periodic restarts, the Radio
MCU can cease tapping its watchdog, which removes power for the predetermined
power-on-reset (POR) delay.
10.3.2 Temperature Considerations
NUTS has so far not been through vacuum and thermal tests. This is necessary
to ensure correct functionality of the proposed watchdog, as well as to avoid de-
stroying the power amplifier and regulators on the electrical power system (EPS).
To efficiently respond to high temperatures, the mission plan recommends treat-
ing this condition as a low battery condition, which initiates the critical system
mode. By reducing radio activity to a minimum and reducing power consumption
in the submodules, heat generated in the power amplifier and the EPS’ regulators
is reduced. It is recommended that temperature sensors are implemented in these
strategic locations, including the battery pack. A fuel gauge with an negative tem-
perature coefficient (NTC) thermistor will enable accurate tracking of the battery
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pack’s temperature.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
In this thesis, detailed mission event plans have been proposed and reviewed. The
mission plans have been evaluated to minimize error and fault consequences, and
to maximize the probability for a mission success. A detailed battery estimation
has been presented along with defined levels for the beacon transmission rate.
The beacon rate has been divided into three levels; low, normal and full. This
aims at reducing power consumption, which together with a battery management
framework, will help the NUTS project towards defining a final power budget for
its flight model. Beacon transmissions at full rate consume 2200 mW, which are
100 % higher than normal rate and 233.33 % higher than low rate.
This thesis has shown the importance of maintaining a net charging state for the
satellite, and the proposed beacon rates will help maintain this state. Being able
to adjust the beacon transmission rate is shown to conserve energy and enable
normal mode operations for a prolonged period of time. An avoidance mode is
defined as an attempt to reach a net charging state without severely inhibiting
on the satellite’s operations. If a net charging state is not achieved in avoidance
mode, NUTS enters a critical mode in order to recharge its battery.
An initial mode has been defined for when the satellite is ejected from the P-POD,
and before contact with ground station has been established. The beacon is set
to its highest rate so the ground station can detect the satellite more easily. With
an average case charging scenario, NUTS consumes less energy than it generates,
suggesting it can sustain initial mode indefinitely.
A method for removing lasting faults by toggling power has been designed and
implemented. Two watchdog proposals have been suggested, a triple modular
redundancy (TMR) watchdog on the backplane and a local watchdog on each
master. The TMR watchdog solution was implemented on an evaluation card, and
has been thoroughly tested and verified. Based on testing results and subsequent
analysis, the most suitable solution for the NUTS project, is the local watchdog
placed on each master module. Both solutions provide the possibility of toggling
power to all subsystems, and have a global reset with a delayed start. Guidelines for
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choosing the time-out period, power-on-reset (POR) delay and threshold voltage
have been provided, and final values must be based on measurements on the pre-
flight test model.
11.1 Further Work
The watchdog circuits must be routed and placed on the on-board computer (OBC)
and Radio module and tested thoroughly. It is also necessary to verify if the power-
on-reset (POR) delay is long enough for all voltages to reach ground before power
is brought back on. This is needed to ensure that toggling of power is successful
in removing any single event latchups (SELs).
The battery management framework must be finalized and a decision to implement
a battery fuel gauge must be made. The satellite must undergo vacuum and
thermal tests to measure how temperature and a lack of convection affects the
systems. Results achieved will, together with reported battery capacity, form the
basis on which the battery management framework regulates power consumption.
Vacuum and thermal tests are also needed to determine changes in time-out period
and POR delay for the watchdog chips.
When all components, modules and software tasks are in place, the estimated
power consumption must be revised in order to be as accurate as possible. This
forms the basis on which the mission event plans can maintain a net charging state
for the satellite.
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Appendix A
System Block Diagram
Figure A.1: The satellite’s systems as proposed. Figure by: Emma Litzler
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Appendix B
Existing Backplane Drawings
All following hardware drawings are created by Dewald de Bruyn and presents
the existing hardware of NUTS’ backplane. Figure B.1 shows the INA219 current
monitoring circuit.
Figure B.1: Power monitoring module [11]
Figure B.2 shows the existing watchdog in the backplane. ADDR0 is used as
watchdog input (WDI) to toggle the watchdog.
Figure B.2: Existing backplane watchdog [11]
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Figure B.3 shows how to address the different modules on the backplane.
Figure B.3: Address match [11]
Figure B.4 shows how the power OR-ing LTC4413 is connected to the current limit
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switch MAX 14523.
Figure B.4: Power distribution [11]
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Appendix C
Battery Management Code
Proposal
1 #include <as f . h>
2 #include " twim . h "
3
4
5 #define battery_minimum_value 5 .8
6 #define battery_under_minimum_value 1
7 #define cur r ent_l im i t 100
8 #define current_l imit_rad io 200
9 #define so lar_sensor_value 1
10
11
12
13 double read_voltages (void ) {
14 //Here the vo l t ag e s at the bat te ry are measured
15 //I2C communication
16 }
17
18 double read_net_current (void ) {
19 //I2C communication to the c o r r e c t chip and get the cur rent
20 //measure
21 twi_package_t packet ;
22 uint8_t twi_data [ 2 ] ;
23 packet . chip =0x01 ; // ! TWI chip address to communicate with .
24 packet . addr [ 1 ] = 0x11 ; // ! TWI address /commands to i s s u e to the
other chip ( node ) .
25 packet . addr_length = 0x01 ; // ! Length o f the TWI data address
segment (1−3 bytes ) .
26 packet . bu f f e r = (void ∗) twi_data ; // ! Where to f i nd the data to be
wr i t t en .
27 packet . l ength = 0x01 ; // ! How many bytes do we want to wr i t e .
28 uint8_t s t a tu s = 0 ;
29 s t a tu s = twi_master_read(&AVR32_TWIM0, &packet ) ;
30
31 i f ( s t a tu s == STATUS_OK){
32 uint16_t vo l tage = ( twi_data [ 0 ] << 8) | twi_data [ 1 ] ;
33 double cur rent = (double ) vo l t age /4 ;
34 return cur rent ;
35 //Write cur rent to log
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36 } else {
37 //Error read ing the cur rent
38 //Write to l og
39 }
40 }
41
42 int i s_charg ing (void ) {
43 //Checks i f the s a t e l l i t e i s charg ing
44 i f ( read_net_current ( ) > 0) {
45 return 1 ;
46 }
47 return 0 ;
48 }
49
50 void l og (double value ) {
51 //Generate timestamp
52 //Write the value in to the memory
53 }
54
55 void submodule_off ( int module ) {
56 //module 0 i s ADCS
57 //module 1 i s Payload ( camera )
58 }
59
60 void submodule_on ( int module ) {
61 //module 0 i s ADCS
62 //module 1 i s Payload ( camera )
63 }
64
65 void al l_submodules_off (void ) {
66 // Short cut i f the batte ry i s c r i t i c a l to turn
67 // o f a l l submodules as qu i ck ly as p o s s i b l e
68 }
69
70 void all_submodules_on (void ) {
71 //Turn on a l l submodules
72 }
73
74 void beacon_rate ( int value ) {
75 //Determine how o f t en the beacon should t ransmi t t
76 //3 i s maximum, whi l e 0 i s o f f .
77 }
78
79 int i n_e c l i p s e (void ) {
80 // checks i f the s a t e l l i t e i s in e c l i p s e
81 i f ( so lar_sensor_value > 10) {
82 return 0 ;
83 }
84 return 1 ;
85 }
86
87 double read_module_current ( int module ) {
88 //module 0 i s ADCS
89 //module 1 i s Payload ( camera )
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90 //module 2 i s rad io
91 }
92
93
94 void powermanagement (void ) {
95 while (1 ) {
96 //The func t i on get_battery_status outputs a value from 0 to 2 ,
97 //were 2 i s f u l l /normal and 0 i s c r i t i c a l
98 switch ( get_battery_status ( ) ) {
99 case 0 :
100 //This i s c r i t i c a l l e v e l
101 //Here everyth ing need to be turned o f f immediately
102 beacon_rate (1 ) ; //This s e t s the beacon ra t e to the lowest
ra t e
103 al l_submodules_off ( ) ; //NOT rad io
104 log ( read_net_current ( ) ) ; //Logs the net cur rent
105 i f ( ! i s_charg ing ( ) && ! i n_ec l i p s e ( ) ) {
106 // something i s wrong
107 //Try f u l l system r e s e t
108 }
109 while ( i s_charg ing ( ) && battery_under_minimum_value ) {
110 //We want to be in t h i s loop un t i l the bat te ry have
reached
111 // i t s minimum value ( nominal 6 . 6V) to operate by
i t s e l f .
112 i f ( battery_minimum_value >= 6 . 6 ) {
113 //Write to l og
114 all_submodules_on ( ) ;
115 beacon_rate (2 ) ;
116 break ;
117 }
118 }
119 break ;
120
121 case 1 :
122 //This mode i s avoidance c r i t i c a l , t ry to reduce cur rent
draw on some
123 //modules be f o r e shut t ing down every module
124 //Check submodules cur rent draw
125 beacon_rate (1 ) ; //Decrease the ra t e o f the beacon to save
power
126 // read the module cur rent to see i f some modules us ing to
much power
127 double ADCS = read_module_current (0 ) ;
128 double payload = read_module_current (1 ) ;
129 double rad io = read_module_current (2 ) ;
130
131 i f (ADCS > current_l imi t ) {
132 submodule_off (0 ) ;
133 //wait a g iven time to turn on the module
134 wait (100) ;
135 submodule_on (0) ;
136 }
137 i f ( payload > cur rent_l imi t ) {
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138 submodule_off (1 ) ;
139 //wait a g iven time to turn on the module
140 wait (100) ;
141 submodule_on (1) ;
142 }
143 i f ( rad io > current_l imit_rad io ) {
144 beacon_rate (1 ) ; // s e t s the beacon ra t e to low
145 }
146
147 i f ( ! i s_charg ing ( ) && ! i n_ec l i p s e ( ) ) {
148 // something i s wrong
149 //Try f u l l system r e s e t
150 }
151
152 while ( i s_charg ing ( ) && battery_under_minimum_value ) {
153 // charge the b a t t e r i e s
154 i f ( battery_minimum_value >= 6 . 6 ) {
155 //Write to l og
156 beacon_rate (2 ) ;
157 all_submodules_on ( ) ;
158 break ;
159 }
160 }
161 break ;
162
163 case 2 :
164 //Normal
165 beacon_rate (2 ) ; // s e t t i n g the beacon ra t e to normal
166 break ;
167
168 default :
169 break ;
170 }
171 }
172 }
Appendix D
Initial Mode Operation
D.1 Burn Off Mechanism
• Current consumption per wire: 350 mA
• Time to burn off nylon cord: 3 seconds
• Number of wires: 4
3 seconds as a fraction of hours:
3sec = 360 · 60 =
1
1200h (D.1)
Energy used by four wires in 3 seconds:
E = 350mA · 11200h · 4 · 3.3V = 3.85mWh (D.2)
Five attempts wires:
Etot = 3.85mWh · 5 = 19.25mWh (D.3)
D.2 Power Calculations
• Battery capacity: 4.4 Ah
• Nominal voltage: 6.6 V
• Battery capacity, watts: 29.040 Wh (4.4Ah · 6.6V )
• Average charging: 3.205 W
• Worst case charging: 1.534 W
• Estimated consumption: 3.025 W
• Average net power: 0.180 W
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• Worst case net power: -1.482 W
Discharging time with worst case charging:
h = 29.040Wh1.482W = 19.6h (D.4)
Appendix E
Battery Management Framework
Calculations
E.1 Critical Mode
• Battery size: 29.040 Wh
• Average case normalized charging: 3.205 W
• Worst case consumption: 1.485 W
– Beacon rate at low (660 mW), backplane (165 mW) and Radio & OBC
MCUs active (660 mW combined)
• Net power: 1.720 W
Completely drained battery charging time to full battery:
h = 29.040Wh1.720W = 16.88h (E.1)
25% battery capacity charging time to full capacity:
h = 29.040Wh− 7.260Wh1.720W = 12.66h (E.2)
From 25% capacity to 50% capacity charging time:
h = 14.520Wh− 7.260Wh1.720W = 4.22h (E.3)
E.2 Normal Mode
A worst case power consumption is when all components are active. The beacon
transmits at its normal rate, causing a power amplifier’s (PA) power consumption
of 1.100 W. Due to NAND flash and FRAM being present on both master modules,
their power consumption is doubled. OWL radio is not included since its protocol
and activity level has not yet been decided.
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CALCULATIONS
• Maximum consumption: 4.446 W
Pmax = PA+2x(MCUs)+ADCS+2x(FRAM)+2x(NAND)+Backplane+Camera
(E.4)
Pmax = 1100 + 660 + 1650 + 198 + 132 + 165 + 541 = 4446mW (E.5)
Appendix F
Test Equipment
• Oscilloscope: Rode & Schwarz Hameg HMO2024 Serial number: 015213802
• Power supply: TTi EL302RT Triple Power Supply Serial number: 350827
Figure F.1: Test setup showing power supply, oscilloscope, Atmel Xplained cards
and evaluation card
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Appendix G
Evaluation Card - Hardware
Drawings
Figure G.1: Hardware drawings - TMR watchdog circuit
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G.1 Additional TMR Watchdog Results
When attempting to drive the watchdogs’ WDI inputs with two directly connected
lines at two different frequencies, the situation becomes as shown in Figure G.2.
The undefined levels of the two signals are as expected when driving one input
directly with two lines from two different sources. This is not sufficient for guaran-
teeing a high to low transition on the watchdogs’ WDI inputs within their time-out
period.
Figure G.2: Directly connecting two WDI lines together without an XOR-gate.
Lines toggling at different frequencies causing an undefined signal (CH1 & CH2),
disregard CH3
Propagation delay from a manual reset condition (CH2) to the voter output goes
low (CH1) was measured to 1.9 µs as seen in Figure G.3. This is the propagation
delay through three logic gates and one watchdog.
If both masters cease to toggle their WDI lines simultaneously, the watchdogs will
cause a reset as seen in Figure G.4.
The case where the 1.25 Hz WDI line remains active and the 5 Hz WDI line is
disabled can be seen in Figure G.5.
Measurements seen in Figure G.6 and G.7 shows time-out periods of 2.58 s and
3.28 s, respectively 25.98 % and 60.16 % higher than the typical value of 2.048 s.
110 APPENDIX G. EVALUATION CARD - HARDWARE DRAWINGS
Figure G.3: Propagation delay from manual reset transition (CH2) to voter output
transition (CH1)
Figure G.4: Appendix - Watchdog time-out after both WDI lines cease to toggle
- Voter output (CH1), WDI input lines (CH2 & CH3)
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Figure G.5: Appendix - Voter output remains high with fast WDI line disabled -
Voter output (CH1), WDI input lines (CH2 & CH3)
Figure G.6: Appendix - Watchdog time-out period variations - chip specific
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Figure G.7: Appendix - Watchdog time-out period variations - chip specific
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G.2 Evaluation Card - Bill of Materials
Table G.1: Bill of materials
Footprint Comment Designator Description Quantity
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_100N C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8 - 8
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_10U C9, C10, C17 - 3
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_22U C11 - 1
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_150N C12, C15, C20 - 3
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_330N C13, C16, C21 - 3
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_0.1U C14, C18, C22 - 3
T_0805 CAPACITOR_T_0805_1U C19 - 1
T_0805 BLM21B102S_T_0805_BLM21PG221S L1, L2 - 2
T_0805 LED_GREEN_T_0805_GREEN LED1, LED2 - 2
HDR2X2 Manual reset P1 Header, 2-Pin, Dual row 1
HDR1X4 Power 3V3 P2 Header, 4-Pin 1
HDR1X3 WDI P3 Header, 3-Pin 1
HDR1X2 3V3_COMP_BP P4 Header, 2-Pin 1
HDR1X2 3V3_BP P5 Header, 2-Pin 1
T_0805 RESISTOR_T_0805_470R R1, R2 - 2
T_0805 RESISTOR_T_0805_100K R3, R4, R5, R6, R7 - 5
T_0805 RESISTOR_T_0805_220K R8 - 1
TSSOP14 74LVC86 U1 Quad 2-input EXCLUSIVE-OR
gate
1
SOT23-5 74LVC1G08 U2, U3, U4, U5, U7, U8 Single 2-input AND gate 6
SOT23-6 74LVC1G332_0 U6 Single 3-input OR gate 1
DFN10 LTC4413 U9 Dual 2.6A, 2.5V to 5.5V, Ideal
Diodes
1
T833+2 MAX16058ATA31+ U10, U11, U13 125nA Supervisory Circuit with
Capacitor-Adjustable Reset and
Watchdog Timeouts, open-drain
reset, Watch-dog timer, 8-Pin
TDFN, -40C to +125C, Pb-Free
3
TDFN8 MAX14523 U12 250mA to 1.5A, Adjustable
Current-Limit Switches
1
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